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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem 
Voluntary organizations are known as crucial requisites for 
democracy in Western societies, where economic and political liberal-
ism prevailed in the post-Reformation era, ahead of the development of 
political pluralism. But there are other cultures in which the egali-
tarian human quality and voluntaristic impulses in human nature have 
not been fully recognized. In such cultures, the self-concept and 
human relations are more likely to be fashioned by an authoritarian 
outlook. 
Authoritarianism is a set of cultural prescriptions for human 
relations and that may shape personality through socialization. As a 
personality syndrome it exhibits submissiveness to authority, aggres-
siveness, fatalism, low tolerance, and rigidity in ideas. 
The bi-variate relationship between authoritarianism and low 
participation in voluntary organizations is well documented; its 
effect as an antecedent variable in pluralism models has not been 
fully tested. Extremely high participation in the electoral process 
(as exhibited in the Phillipines, 0 r Korea) coupled with high protest 
activities are opposite phenomena of "diffuse support" which is an 
essential for the stable democracy. These behavioral phenomena could 
have their roots in authoritarian submissiveness and aggression. In 
1 
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other words, with highly authoritarian people, political pluralism 
may be difficult to apply. However, if the theses of pluralism are 
universally valid, they should be operable among highly authoritarian 
people through mobilization or mediation by voluntary organizations. 
Authoritarianism is also found even in some segments of demo-
cratic societies such as America. Such authoritarianism may have its 
roots in the childhood socialization or may reflect experiences from 
lower class position. Authoritarian persons are less likely to par-
ticipate in voluntary organizations, but there are voluntary organi-
zations that induce even authoritarians to get involved (such as rel-
igious or political extremist movements). Such nonvoluntary involve-
ment in organizations is more likely to happen in societies where gov-
ernments can forge such organizations and pressure the people to join 
them. Also, even in free societies, those who feel alienated and root-
less (such as some racial minorities and new immigrants in America) are 
more likely to join the readily accessible organizations (N. Babchuck 
& R.B. Thompson, 1962). 
When people's participation in voluntary organizations is less 
voluntaristic and when such people are highly authoritarian, the poli-
tical socialization effects of the voluntary organizations may become 
questionable. If voluntary organizations do not function to modify 
highly authoritarian attitudes, which might be related to low political 
efficacy despite high participation in the electoral process, they can 
be easily mobilized by totalitarian political movements. Also, if the 
voluntary organizations do not function as countervailing devices 
against oppressive regimes, authoritarians might easily use them as 
3 
their protest channels to release their repressed aggression toward 
the regime or authority figures. This is happening in less developed 
countries. The two faces of authoritarian vulnerability have been well 
demonstrated especially in Iran under the Shah and later under Khomeni. 
It is also questionable how the new immigrants from such authoritarian 
backgrounds would do in a new voluntaristic social setting. 
In order to explore this question further, the writer selected 
a specific ethnic group which is relatively new to this country and 
supposedly highly authoritarian. The case in point is the Korean 
imnigrant group in the Chicago area. i The Koreans have been the third- U 
fastest growing immigrant group in the United States during the 1970s. 
The yearly inflow of this group reached more than 30,000, exceeding 
the annual immigration quotas assigned them during the late 1970s. 
Currently, the Korean-American population is estimated at more than 
1 
1,000,000 of which 80,000 are said to be living in the Chicago area. 
The social network of Chicago Koreans includes 100-plus ethnic 
churches (including house churches), more than 200 voluntary organi-
zations, and two Korean-language daily newspapers. But this group 
is experiencing difficulties in organizing political leadership and 
mobilizing its resources for political goals. That is why the general 
applicability of the pluralism model is brought into question. 
B. The Korean Political Culture 
The dominant features of Korean political culture are precisely 
described by Khil (1984) as: the politics of hierarchy and deference, 
the politics of voter mobilization, increasing participatory orienta-
4 
tion, widening elite-mass cleavage, and the politics of defiance during 
acute crises. Those characteristics can be summarized in three elements 
which are relevant to this study. 
1. The Politics of Hierarchy and Deference 
The most dominant characteristics of Korean politics appear as 
hierarchy and deference in authority relations. Those who are in lead-
ership position perceive their roles to be active, commanding ones, 
while those on the receiving end accept their roles as blind submis-
sive ones. Vertical and unequal interpersonal relations prevail in 
Korean society at every level including family, school, formal group, 
and workplace, all probably manifesting the Confucian hierarchical 
principle. Such verticality is especially acute between the rulers and 
the governed, elite and mass. The ruler takes a paternalistic attitude 
toward the mass, and the ruled accept total submission toward and com-
pliance with the authority. 
On the basis of this hierarchical structuring, it is relatively 
easy for the person in power to exercise supreme leadership with the 
support of loyal military generals and technocrats. Political parti-
cipation by the masses is tightly controlled and manipulated by the 
supreme leader. 
The sense of deference for persons in superior position is found 
in the public language. Nopun-Saram (someone on high) exists in 
most collectivities. Especially the word Gowicheung (high ranks) 
formerly a common word, is now being used as a formal expression by the 
newspapers to indicate the President indirectly. Decisions made by the 
President are referred to Youngdan (heroic decisions) by the major 
5 
Korean news media. 
2. Politics of Voter Mobilization 
The Korean constitution has prescribed universal voting rights 
since the 1948 independence of the Republic of Korea in the south. 
During the four decades since, five regimes have succeeded, in turn, 
with most of the rulers manipulating the popular vote. The earlier 
three civilian regimes allowed free elections manipulating the process 
with maximum participation by the less educated voters in supporting 
the candidates or issues presented by the ruling party. The opposi-
tion party could obtain a foothold only in the big cities. This split 
in support is termed Yo-chon Ya-do (ruling party in farms, opposi-
tion in cities). The two recent military regimes have tightly con-
trolled and manipulated elections, blocking the direct election of the 
President who sits at the apex of the power pyramid and whose defeat 
would mean the collapse of the ruling party. 
Therefore, political participation in Korea is largely the result 
of directives from Gowicheung (President) with the citizenry compel-
led to play essentially passive roles in campaigns and voting. Other-
wise, their livelihoods could be directly or indirectly threatened. 
Political participation is not of the voluntary kind generally found 
in Western democracies. Mass participation operates by habitual com-
pliance with the order of authority, not by voluntary support. The 
increasing political participation in post-war Korea has not been a 
direct result of conscious choice by the populace, except for the 
case of the short-lived, chaotic, liberal regime of premier Chang 
Myun in 1960-61. 
6 
3. Elite-Mass Gap and Potential for Rebellion 
There has been a wide gap between the Korean elites and masses 
in their perception of political issues through the past century. This 
gap is an outgrowth of the caste system of traditional Korea, and still 
fosters class consciousness among the masses. The most recent caste 
system in Korea was the Yang-bahn system (twin-class of scholars and 
warriors), while all others remained as Sang-min (common people). Only 
Yang-bahn had the right to be recruited to public offices, with Sang-
min rarely having such opportunity until the turn of the 20th century. 
The masses (Sang-min) were not even allowed to have an education 
(mostly reading Confucian literatures in tutorial settings) until the 
final days of the Yi dynasty (1890s). The masses were not expected to 
hold opinions on social issues, let alone political ones, in traditional 
Korea. But the elite-mass gap in perception and preference on conflict-
ing issues historically resulted in several revolts by the masses. 
The Tonghak revolt (1894) was the most significant uprising in 
the political modernization of Korea because it was based on beliefs in 
egalitarianism. The leader of this revolt proclaimed that man had dev-
ine quality and all were created equally. But this religio-political 
movement was crushed by foreign troops and resulted in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-95. 
Although Tonghak might not have been clearly referred to, its 
spirit or sense of people's rights has played a key role in more con-
temporary bloody revolts in Korea. Outbreaks of defiance and rebel-
lion have often had the explosive power of a volcanic eruption when 
the masses have perceived governmental authorities and policies to be 
7 
arbitrary and unjust. The Sam-il (March 1, 1919) independence move-
ment against the Japanese colonial rulers, the April Student Revolution 
of 1960 against Syngman Rhee's dictatorial regime, and the 1980 Kwang-
ju uprising against the current military power group all are said to 
have been triggered by the spirit of Minjoong (people or masses). 
Because the Korean people are generally submissive to and defer-
ential toward authority during normal and routine periods, their acts 
of defiance and rebellion may sound contradictory and incomprehensible. 
But it is significant that their anger and frustration have accumulated 
under the cover of passive and compliant behavior, over a period of 
time. Nevertheless, an act of defiance, when it reaches the boiling 
point of massive protest, takes the form of violence, including anarchic 
behavior. 
The questions explored through this research are expected to shed 
some light, not only on the potential of this group's political assimil-
ation into the United States, but also on the potential for democracy in 
their homeland. The findings may have similar relevance for other new 
innnigrant groups coming from similar authoritarian backgrounds and for 
those in their homelands. 
C. Theoretical Aims of the Research 
This study links the variables at three levels of analysis: per-
sonality, culture, and society. A research of this nature has a poten-
tial for contributing to at least the following purposes. 
1. Voluntary Organization Research 
This study explores the psychological roots opposite to volun-
8 
tarism and attempts to link them to the positive functions of voluntary 
organizations. By doing this, this study could partially fill a notable 
gap in research between the powerful effects of parental socialization 
vs. those of voluntary organizations (D.H. Smith, 1975). It aims also 
to shed some light on the question of whether attitude and personality 
dispositions are to be seen as causes or consequences of voluntary 
organization participation. The answers vary by researchers and the 
issue remains unresolved. 
2. The Theory of Socialization 
The effects of earlier (parental) socialization have been widely 
studied. But adult socialization, especially the causes of sudden 
attitudinal and behavioral changes in the later life-cycle, needs more 
attention. This study offers a comparison of the effects of child and 
adult socializations. 
3. The Theory of Unconventional Political Participation 
Unconventional political participation (protest activities) is a 
new area of study in political sociology and political science (Barnes 
& Kasse, 1979). The deterrent effect of voluntary organizations to 
protest activities has been suggested by mass politics theorists (Korn-
hauser, 1959), but voluntary organizations can also promote protest 
activities. This study will explore the strengths in both directions. 
D. Plan of Presentation 
After reviewing related literature in Chapter II, theoretical 
designs and major variables are discussed in Chapter III. Historical 
backgrounds and demographic description of Korean immigrants (as a part 
9 
of the findings) are presented in Chapter IV. Authoritarian features 
and involvement in organizations are described in Chapter V; then, in 
the same chapter, political affects are examined as the dependent vari-
able of authoritarianism under the influence of organizational involve-
ment. Chapter VI deals with how the respondents' voting participation 
and political issue preferences are affected by the preceding variables 
(authoritarianism, organizational involvement, and political affects). 
In Chapter VII, major findings are summarized and discussed within the 
theoretical framework of political sociology and also within that of 
adaptation theories. Then the conclusion of the research follows in 
Chapter VIII. 
NOTE 
1. Data from the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C.; published 
by the Korea Times-Chicago, March 12, 1987. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A. Pluralism 
1, Background of Pluralism 
The role of voluntary associations in democracy has drawn the 
attention of political theorists since Aristotle. As a socio-politi-
cal theory, pluralism has its origins in Greek and Judaeo-Christian 
heritages. The decisive event for the uniquely pluralistic character 
of the West is the Reformation and its outcomes. Religious toleration 
and freedom of conscience were conceived as a natural right. 
Locke assumed that individuals have the unalienable right to 
associate and that this right of groups demythologized the soverignty 
of the state (Horn, 1969). English pluralists of the 19th and 20th 
centuries promoted the demythicizing of the state and anticipated act-
ive participatory citizenship (Laski, 1920; Cole, 1920). 
Although voluntary associations are found in many other socie-
ties, their successful integration into the political system is viewed 
as primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon. Tocqueville (1947) was the 
first author who perceived the connection between the proliferation of 
voluntary associations in America and the democratic character of the 
society. Pluralism has been the unspoken ideology of American politi-
cal practice as both a normative and an empirical frame of reference 
for much of the nation's history. 
10 
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In France, voluntary associations were selectively restricted 
by Rousseau's theory of "general will" which was hostile to plural 
societies. Therefore, a number of repressed associations developed 
but were not allowed to function openly in the political arena (Rose, 
1954). 
In Germany, both the conception and tradition of voluntary asso-
ciations were confined within a corporate view. German liberal theo-
rists of the 19th century considered the rights of individuals as sub-
ordinate to those of community and the state. The crucial ideas of 
natural law and of the state as an association with limited purposes 
were absent from German political theory. This is why Germans moved in 
the direction of political nihilism and totalitarianism (Iggers, 1965). 
The Western philosophical and religious beliefs, ethical aspira-
tions, empirical findings, and structure of personalities are more or 
less sufficiently integrated to the foundations for the theory and 
practice of political pluralism, although there is still a lack of 
understanding of its processes of integration (Chapman, 1969, p.93). 
In the American scene, the role of voluntary associations in 
the democratic process has been examined and explained by Lipset and 
his colleagues (1956). They asserted that democratic politics neces-
sarily rest on a multitude of independent organizations. 
Such organizations serve in a society as a whole or in unions 
(i) as arenas within which new ideas are generated, (ii) communi-
cation networks through which people may learn and form attitudes 
about politics, (iii) as means of training potential opposition 
leaders in skills of politics, and as a place in which they can 
attain the status necessary to become political leaders, (iv) as 
one of the principal means of getting individuals to participate 
in the larger political arena, and (v) as bases of opposition to 
the central authority (1956, p.89). 
12 
2. Two Analytical Models of Pluralism 
The choice of an explanatory model of pluralism is basic to 
definitions of democracy. In the conflict perspective, political 
democracy is the process in which all active and legitimate groups 
compete to receive a hearing at some crucial stage in the process of 
making a decision. The task of the political process is to accommo-
date the conflicting demands of individuals or groups, with the domi-
nant mechanism as bargaining (Dahl, 1965; Keim, 1975). 
In the structural-functional perspective, democracy is a system 
which recognizes and enforces the rights of the individual to partici-
pate in making decisions that affect him and his community (Bacharch, 
1975). The key processes are direct or indirect participation in the 
formulation and dispersion of opinion and in decision making. The 
dominant mechanism in this process is arriving at consensus by maximum 
participation in voting. 
These two processes are complementary, and the study of condi-
tions encouraging democracy, therefore, must focus on the sources of 
both cleavage and consensus (Lipset, 1963). Upon the choice of pers-
pective, whether to maximize consensus through optimal participation 
by individuals or whether to accommodate conflicting demands of groups 
in their access to power, pluralists make distinctions between mobil-
ization and intermediation models. 
a. Mobilization Model 
The mobilization version (which underlies the social participa-
tion thesis) focuses on individual actors and maintains that involve-
ment in voluntary associations will activate individuals politically. 
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The theorists of this version emphasize the recruiting and training 
function of voluntary associations for potential political actor. They 
posit, after K. Deutsch's (1961) concept, that mobilization is "the 
process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psycho-
logical commitments are eroded or broken and people become available 
for new patterns of socialization and behavior." Deutsch uses this 
concept in the context of modernization of traditional societies and 
argues that this progress is required for political development. 
Although the original concept denotes institutional, normative, 
and attitudinal changes at a macro-societal level, it also involves 
the induction processes of personal activities by mobilizing agents. 
People caught in traditional societies and politically inactive must 
be mobilized through involvement in new social contexts (such as vol-
untary associations) if they are to become politically active. 
The mobilization perspective rests on several assumptions: 
involvement in voluntary associations (i) broadens an individual's 
interest in political affairs and issues; (ii) stimulates the indivi-
dual's political activity via interactions with others; (iii) increas-
es one's information and leadership skills; and (iv) provides gratifi-
cation for participation in political activities and a sense of satis-
faction with the democratic process as members perceive the process 
and results in concrete situation (D.L. Rogers et al., 1975). 
The politically relevant key process in the voluntary organi-
zation is socialization of the members or the participants. This 
socializing process is easily, and perhaps best, explained with the 
concept of "reference group." Finifer (1974) made her argument on the 
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basis of three related propositions, that: (i) people do identify with 
members in the groups; (ii) these identifications motivate responsive-
ness to normative cues coming from the groups; and (iii) the level of 
integration varies according to the degree of identifications with 
1 
others in the groups. 
The effects of participation in voluntary association have been 
demonstrated by many empirical data as active political involvement. 
Although they did not explicitly mention the mobilization theory, 
numerous researchers since W. Dennis (1930) found a causal relation-
2 
ship between involvement in voluntary associations and in politics. 
It is also postulated that political participatory behavior is pre-
ceded by a set of attitudinal and value changes. The aggregate of 
the attitudes and values held by the people of a given society is 
called their political culture. 
The concept of political culture was first introduced by Gabriel 
Almond (1956). Political culture is a set of attitudes, beliefs, and 
sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and 
govern the political behavior in a given political system. Almond 
(1951), citing Parsons and Shils' General Theory of Action, identi-
fied three elements of political culture as (i) the cognitive, (ii) 
the affective, and (iii) the evaluative. Almond (1956), along with 
Verba (1965) introduced several measurable dimensions of political 
culture. Within their approach, political efficacy is considered 
as the key predisposing variable in personal political activity. 
Efficacy is an outcome of various socializations through the political 
actors' lives, and political mobilization at a macro-level can have 
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much effect on it. It is both the product of a political system and 
the life history of the members of that system. Thus, they treated 
political culture as both an independent and dependent variable of the 
political system (Almond and Verba, 1980). 
Almond and Verba (1965) saw "political affect," as the aggregate 
form of the psychological dimension of politics, and as the key element 
of political efficacy. "The feeling is perhaps the most important test 
of the legitimacy of its political system and it is also the most im-
portant measure of political alienation and aspiration" (1965, 100 -
252). These emotional elements are oriented toward (i) the political 
system as a whole (system affect), (ii) the administration and regul-
ations (output affect), (iii) the processes and agencies involved in 
election and policy implementation (input affect), and (iv) the poli-
tical actor himself being subject to the political system (civic 
3 
affect). 
System theorists were more concerned about the objective affect 
felt toward the system. lane's key concept, "trust in the system" 
(1962) and Easton's concept of "diffuse support" (1965), correspond to 
Almond and Verba's "system output affect" or "objective competence" 
(1965). "Political culture" is a public subculture which is the res-
ource of political socialization, and which can be acquired by indi-
viduals through internalization. Also it has been proved that invol-
vement in voluntary organizations results in a significant increase of 
efficacy. Almond and Verba found in their five-nation study that mem-
bership even in nonpolitical organizations affects the members' poli-
tical attitudes. They postulated that the experience of social inter-
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action, the opportunity to participate in decision making, and the 
general broadening of perspectives that occurs in the organizational 
activities all would be expected to increase individuals' potential 
for political involvement. And they found in all five nations they 
surveyed that those respondents who are members of organizations are 
generally higher in the subjective competence scale and those respond-
ents who consider their organizations to be involved in politics have 
higher subjective competence (1963, 305-373). J.D. Wright (1970) and 
R.E. Bunch (1974) also found similar results in their research. 
For the last three decades, the theoretical and methodological 
flaws with the major variables of political culture have not been re-
solved. However, their concepts and measures have been narrowed to 
three separate variables; ie. "internal (political) efficacy," "ex-
ternal (political) efficacy," and "poltical trust" (Craig, 1979). 
b. Mediation Model 
The mediation model focuses on the autonomy of voluntary assoc-
iations and their protective function for individuals against monopol-
ized power. The so-called "mass society" viewpoint holds that the des-
truction of old communities has separated individuals from social ties, 
and that this atomization has produced a sense of powerlessness which 
can be both personally devastating and destructive to democratic pro-
cesses. Their important theme concerns the organizational tie that 
must mediate between the isolated, hence potentially powerless, indi-
viduals and the massive state. 
There are two major versions of mass political theory originat-
ing from two opposite intellectual sources (Kornhauser, 1959, p.21f). 
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The democratic version asserts that the masses are vulnerable to domi-
nation by the elite. This danger to political order and civil liberty 
is believed to result from the automization of society and the rise of 
an elite capable of mobilizing isolated and unattached people. The 
aristocratic version stresses that the primary cause of mass politics 
lies in the loss of exclusiveness of the elite as a result of greater 
popular participation in the critical center of society. According to 
this version, the main danger to political order and civil liberty is 
the domination of the elite by masses. 
Arnold Rose postulated that in the United States a plurality of 
voluntary organizations plays a major role in supporting democracy by 
(i) distributing power over social life among a large portion of the 
people (1954. p.51); (ii) by serving "to tie society together and to 
minimize the disintegrating effects of conflict;" and (iii) by giving 
individuals a feeling of identification and status (1967, pp.250-51). 
In contrast, French voluntary organizations were ineffective in medi-
ation because they were based on the tradition of Catholicism, a lib-
eral tradition concerned with freedom of individuals, and a strong re-
pressive central government (1954, p.114). 
Kornhauser (1959) saw that there are tendencies toward loss of 
autonomy both by the elite and by independent groups in modern soci-
ety. A society is a "mass society" to the extent that both elite and 
nonelite are directly accessible to one another by virtue of the weak-
ness of groups capable of mediating between them. Mass politics occurs 
when a large number of people engage in political activity outside the 
procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action. 
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Kornhauser argues that liberal democracy requires widespread 
participation in the selection of leaders and a large amount of self-
governing activity on the part of the nonelite. And to the basic ques-
tion of what kind of social structure meets these conditions of liberal 
democracy, Kornhauser answers that social pluralism is the arrangement 
which performs this function. 
A plurality of independent and limited-function groups sup-
ports liberal democracy by providing social bases of free and open 
competition for leadership, widespread participation in the selec-
tion of leaders, restraint in the application of pressures on lead-
ers, and self-government in wide areas of social life. Therefore, 
where social pluralism is strong, liberty and democracy tend to be 
strong; and conversely, forces which weaken social pluralism also 
weaken liberty and democracy (1959. pp.230-31). 
Neal and Seeman (1964) have argued that what is congruent with 
the mass society thesis is that "membership in mediating organizations 
is an element in generating a fundamental sense that the persons' soc-
ial world is manageable." Their finding supported the idea that power-
lessness is a function of the lack of mediating organizational ties. 
However, they were unsure whether organizational membership leads to 
low alienation (structural argument) or that only the nonalienated 
join organizations (motivational argument). They agreed that both 
processes were in operation in their research. 
Therefore, the theory of mass society stresses the need for the 
autonomy of certain social units if order with freedom is to be sec-
ured, whether primary emphasis is placed on the autonomy of the elite 
or on the nonelite (Neal and Seeman 1964, pp.226-29). 
The mediation version of pluralism takes the view that even 
normally nonpolitical associations can temporarily play the role of 
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"para-political" actors by participating directly in the political 
system, influencing political leaders' decision making and providing 
the channels between the political elite and their constituents. In 
this approach, voluntary associations are seen as the actors, even 
while the effects on members are not focused. 
What we should consider along with mediation model is the impact 
of unconventional political involvement by the masses. Unconventional, 
noninstitutional political behavior has received comprehensive atten-
tion from Gurr (1968). Disruptive political protest is seen to have 
its roots in relative deprivation of general values (Gurr, 1968). A 
lack of general affect toward political authority was deemed as an 
alternative motive for protest behaviors by Gamson (1968) and Wright 
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(1970). Easton termed this as lack of "diffuse support" (1965). 
Muller (1972) differentiated political dissent from conventional pol-
itical behavior on the basis of the presence or absence of three pro-
perties: (a) conformity to legal regime norms, (b) conformity to cus-
tomary regime norms, and (c) the use of violence. 
The mobilization and mediation versions of pluralistic theory 
are not incompatible, and both functions could be performed by the 
same association. However, those are separate processes that must 
be kept analytically distinct. 
B. Authoritarianism 
Considerations of the role of authoritarian character in social 
structure and the rise of Fascism began in the 1930s and 1940s. The 
debate was continued after Adorno and his colleagues (1950) introduced 
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the F-scale to measure anti-semitic prejudice. Because of the rigid-
ity of their ego defense-mechanisms, susceptibility to radical politi-
cal ideologies, and tendencies toward submission/domination, authori-
tarian personalities have been also considered as non- or antidemocra-
tic personalities. The negative relationship between authoritarianism 
and democratic political process has been widely recognized. 
Although Adorno admitted that it was not possible to use their 
F-scale alone as the basis of selecting their interviewees, they were 
confident of relating the 38-item F-scale to various other indices of 
antidemocratic personality, brought to light by other techniques. 
They did not proceed with this in a strictly empirical fashion but 
were guided by a theoretical orientation, constructing each scale item 
with a hypothesis, involving following variables (1950. p.228f): 
(i) Conventionalism: Rigid adherence to conventional middle-
class values. (ii) Authoritarian submission: Submissive attitude 
toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group. (iii) Auth-
oritarian aggression: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to 
condemn those who violate the conventional values. (iv) Anti-
intraception: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the 
tender-minded. (v) Superstition and stereotype: Belief in mystic 
determinants of the individual's fate. (vi) Power and toughness: 
Preoccupation with dominance-submission, strong/weak, leader/fol-
lower dimension(identifies with power figures). (vii) Destructive-
ness and cynicism: Generalized hostility and vilification of the 
human. (viii) Projectivity: Projection outwards of wild emotional 
impulses. (ix) Sex: Exaggerated concern with sexual 'goings-on' 
These variables were thought of as going together to form a psy-
chological cluster, more or less enduring personality structure that 
predisposes him to be receptive to anti-democratic propaganda. The 
coherence of the scale items could better be explained theoretically, 
by positing an inner structure of personality than on the ground of 
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external association. Also in order to cover a widely underlying the-
ory, single items were sometimes used to represent two or more differ-
ent concepts (228~229). 
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Despite the criticisms and attempts to replace the F-scale, 
there followed empirical evidence which showed that authoritarianism 
and other personality traits patterned by early childhood socializa-
tion can be transferred to one's political attitudes (Pye, 1962; 
Almond and Verba, 1963; Renshon, 1977). Authoritarians tend to have 
low political efficacy and low trust in the system (Greenstein, 1965; 
Rosenau, 1975). And authoritarianism is related to an isolationist 
6 
attitude, lack of efficacy, and nonvoting (Knutson, 1972). It is also 
related to a habit of submission, little access to the sources of in-
formation, lack of verbal facility, and unwillingness to participate 
in middle-class culture (Knuffer, 1947). Authoritarians do not join 
many community groups as compared with nonauthoritarians (Sanford, 
1950). Janowitz & Marvick (1953) and Sanford (1950) noted that the 
F-scale was related negatively to voting in a cross-cultural sample. 
Milbrath and Klein (1962) found the tendency for high F-scorers to 
shun political activities. 
However, authoritarianism is not always related to nonpartici-
pation. Mass politics theorists found that authoritarians are more 
susceptible to totalitarian mobilization (Kornhauser, 1959). Lane 
found that; authoritarians tend to have lower political efficacy and 
lower political participation; to be more susceptible to group pres-
sure or to personal and material advantages which make them join orga-
nizations and participate in politics (Lane, 1972). Massive partici-
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pation by such authoritarians might endanger the stability of the 
system because of their submissiveness to authority and their need to 
express their unconscious hostility (Greenstein, 1969). 
NOTES 
1. Freeman & Showe! (1950) are those who focused on mobili-
zation effect through organizations as reference groups, and so did 
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), Verba & Nie (1972), Olsen (1972), 
D.Jaros & L.Grant (1974). 
2. This relationship has been supported in the studies by 
Freedman & Alex (1952), Berelson et.al. (1954), Hastings (1954), 
Lipset et.al. (1956), C.R.Wright & H.H.Hyman (1958), Lane (1959), 
Milbrath (1965), and others. 
3. Apart from the above authors, Campbell (1954) developed the 
Sense of Political Efficacy Scale, which measures an individual's 
feelings about the effects of his own action on political events. 
This is equivalent to Almond and Verba's 'subjective competence' 
(Wright, 1972). As Gamson (1968) narrowed down 'political culture' 
into two measurable dimensions, 'efficacy' (input dimension) and 
'trust' (output dimension), 'political culture' has been generally 
measured by the foregoing two types of scales. 
4. Another explanation comes from social learning theory. Some 
suitable cues (such as ideology or successful experience of aggres-
sive model behaviors) will lead to aggressive behavior. In addition 
to this cognitive/motivational explanation, Kass & March (1979) gave 
attention to the individual's position in the society (status, age, 
organizational membership, etc.) and socio-political values as the 
important antecedent variables of political action. 
5. R. Christie (1954) asserted that the F-scale captured someth-
ing other than authoritarianism because it was constructed without a 
hypothesis and adequate data. Christie and P. Cook (1958) again cri-
ticized that it tapped only earlier childhood authoritarianism. 
Greenstein (1965, 1969) saw the F-Scale as a valuable tool in connect-
ing psychology and political studies but expressed his doubts about 
the exact content it was supposed to be measuring. He also pointed 
out the response-set problem with the scale. C. Bay criticized its 
cognitive simplification (1958). E.Shils (1954) criticized the F-
scale for failing to discriminate between leftist and rightist autho-
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ritarianism. 
Knutson (1972) critically reviewed the F-scale as setting a 
false dichotomy without narrowing down rightist authoritarianism and 
without mentioning democratic scale. She saw the F-scale measuring 
the individual's value prefereces rather than personality traits. 
However, there have been many researchers who have tried to improve 
the utility of the F-scale. 
R. Lee and P. Warr (1969), Byrne(l974) are among those who tried 
it in two respects: (i) by attempting to extract the scale items for 
behavioral traits from those for value (belief) preferences, and (ii) 
by attempting to offset the response set problems. Berkowitz and 
Walkon (1964), Gough and Lazzari (9174) successfully tested F scale by 
reducing the original items. 
Ray (1976) focused on the dominance-submission dimension of the 
authoritarian personality and developed a 26-item Directiveness scale. 
Both scales appeared to have a positive relationship with the F-scale 
and to be usable along with the F-scale. 
Instead of F-scale, Rokeach (1960) developed his Dogmatism 
scale which measures the rigidity of personality in value preferences. 
He argued that the Dogmatism scale was associated with the F-scale but 
was more accurate in dealing with authoritarianism (1967). 
6. There is some empirical evidence which did not confirm the 
relationship between authoritarianism and low political activity. 
Knutson (1972) rather hypothesized that authoritarians with lower 
needs to fulfill will be nonparticipants, while those motivated by 
unfulfilled needs for affection or esteem will join or lead organiza-
tions. She attempted to test Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' (1943) 
in association with authoritarianism in political behavior. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL DESIGN AND DATA 
A. Postulates and Hypotheses 
The following postulates and hypotheses are derived from the 
previous theoretical considerations within the review of the liter-
ature, and have been tested against data. 
1. Postulates 
a. Those high in authoritarian personality traits are less 
active in their participation in voluntary organizations and in poli-
tics than those with low authoritarian traits. 
b. Individuals have different cognitions, affects, and eva-
luations of their roles in the political system and the performance of 
the political system. The aggregate of such cognitions, affects, and 
evaluations is a part of the political culture of a given society. 
And the political culture of each country is a key factor which fost-
ers or inhibits political participation, development of democracy, and 
stability of the polity. 
c. Participation in voluntary organizations does politicize 
individuals by increasing their knowledge about politics, sensitivity 
to issues, and skills or capacity to act politically and most of all 
it increases political competence. 
d. Participation in the electoral process (from campaign to 
voting) is the major type of political activity which fulfills the 
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principle of democracy. However, protest behaviors also have their 
part in the democratic process if discretely exercised. 
2. Hypotheses 
a. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary 
organizations have higher political competence than authoritarians 
who do not participate in voluntary organizations, in terms of their 
affect about their own position as a political subject, their ability 
to influence the political system, the output responses by the politi-
cal system, and the national political system as a whole. 
b. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary 
organizations and have higher political competence are more likely to 
participate in the electoral process than those who do not participate 
in voluntary organizations. 
c. In their choices of political issues, the authoritarian 
and politically less competent individuals exhibit significantly dif-
ferent emphases than their less authoritarian and more politically 
competent counterparts. The authoritarian/ less competent are more 
likely to pref er basic needs-oriented and homeland-oriented political 
issues. 
B. Variables 
1. Independent Variable 
a. Authoritarianism: There are a number of versions of the F-
scale designed and tested by researchers. In the 1972 National Elec-
tion Study (by SRC), a six-item scale was used to measure authoritarian 
aggression and submission, deleting other dimensions of the F-scale. 
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This SRC scale was adopted in the current study, with minor changes 
in wording to convey culturally relevant meanings and to prevent 
response-set problems. 
The original design of this study assumed that these six items 
would form a single scale that measures one dimension, i.e., authori-
tarian aggression/submission. But examination of the correlation among 
the six items (and with dependent variables) revealed that these items 
are measuring at least two different dimensions (authoritarian submis-
sion/aggression and liberal/conservative attitude) simultaneously. 
Therefore, two separate indices, Authoritarian Index and Liberalism 
Index, were constructed (Appendix I.1.). 
2. Intervening Variable 
a. Organizational Participation: In the current study, eight 
types of ethnic (provincial, alumni, service-oriented, professional, 
etc.) organizations were specified. The degree of participation was 
measured by the respondent's total number of memberships, officerships, 
and frequency of attendance in organizations; they made the composite 
Organizational index (Appendix I.2.). Involvement in churches is ex-
cluded from the index because its voluntariness has been questionable. 
3. Dependent Variable 
a. Political Efficacy: Taking the affective dimension from 
the political culture approach (Almond and Verba, 1963), the current 
study measured (i) the individual's feeling about being subjected to 
the political system, (ii) input affect to the political processes, 
(iii) output affect toward the political system, and (iv) the feeling 
about the political system as a whole. 
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Following the theoretical model of Almond and Verba (1963), 
R.E. Bunch (1968) studied the political orientation of Japanese-
Americans of Oregon. Since the scale items revised by Bunch were too 
complicated to use in a mailed survey, this researcher used a new 
omnibus of political competence scales, deleting cognitive and eva-
luative dimensions from the !CPR questionnaire (Appendix I.3). 
b. Political Participation: It would be desirable to have 
this variable as the dependent variable. But when this study was being 
planned, the majority of the sample were not expected to be naturalized 
citizens who could vote; and even among the citizens, very few were 
expected to have registered for voting. Therefore, this variable was 
not seriously considered as the dependent variable. However, after 
the survey, it was found that Koreans may not be invisible voters. 
Some of the political-participation items were designed to mea-
sure the future potential of participation by those who were not yet 
eligible voters (noncitizens). These people, also, were asked about 
their involvement in the political meetings, monetary contributions, 
etc. Also the potential for political protest activities was examined 
as a form of unconventional political participation along with politi-
cal issue preferences (details in Chapter VI). 
C. Data 
The primary data were generated from the Korean communities of 
the Chicago area and the neighboring Midwestern states by means of a 
readership survey of the Korea Times (the largest Korean language 
daily newspaper in the Midwest). The National Election Data -(1972-76 
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panel studies by SRC; and 1980-82 Election studies by ICPR) and the 
1980 Census data have been partially used for comparison. The reason 
for using the old SRC data is that these are latest available ones 
which measured authoritarianism along with participation in voluntary 
organizations and in politics. 
1. Sampling 
There is no way to know the exact size of the population for 
the Korean sampling. The 1980 census enumerated about 24,000 Koreans 
in Illinois but the Korean community's own estimate is two or three 
times larger than that. The Korean Directory published by the Korean 
Association of Chicago in 1982 lists about 4,000 names. But compiling 
and publishing that kind of list normally takes a year, so a high pro-
portion of the list is out-of-date. Any chosen list of Koreans in the 
area must be checked against the Illinois Bell Directory because these 
new immigrants are highly mobile. Still, this elaboration might ex-
clude those who do not have telephones. The problem is even worse in 
the case of Koreans residing in the neighboring states. 
The most reasonable sampling method, in this respect, seems to 
be cluster sampling (or area sampling). While it is impossible to 
list the whole Korean-American population in the area, a researcher can 
reduce the listing problem to manageable proportions by first sampling 
a set of clusters which contain the population and then enumerate/ 
randomly select from the clusters (Sonia R. Wright, 1979, p.22). 
The Korea Times keeps an up-to-date list of its subscribers 
(totaling about 7,500 including out-of-state readers), but this list 
has limited value for sampling a population because it excludes non-
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subscribers. However, a readership survey of a considerably large 
sampling was expected to bring in a well balanced representation of 
the population. This type of sample could not be random in the sense 
that it excludes the nonsubscribers of the newspaper. But the initial 
selection of those who received the questionnaire was done randomly 
within the population of the subscribers. And the cross-comparison 
with previous Korean sample studies in the Chicago area and with the 
U.S. Census qualified the representativeness of the current sample. 
At first, target clusters were identified by postal zip codes 
in the city of Chicago and its suburbs while each of the six states 
other than Illinois was taken as a single unit. Thirty per cent of 
the subscribers were randomly selected from each target zip code or 
units (Appendix II.1.). 
Initially 1,077 subscribers (417 from the city of Chicago, 208 
from Chicago suburbs, and 452 from neighboring states) were selected. 
The first questionnaires were mailed out in mid-September, 1983 (for 
the city of Chicago city and its suburbs). Other than writing in pos-
tal zip codes, the respondents were not asked to identify themselves. 
The guarantee for anonymity of the respondents was clearly mentioned 
at the top of the questionnaire and in the newspaper's announcement 
about the beginning of this survey. 
Because the initial return rate was too low, about two-thirds 
of the suburban sample and half of the Chicago city sample received a 
second wave of questionnaires during the first two weeks of November 
1983. At this time the neighboring state addresses received their 
single mailing of questionnaires. A third wave of questionnaires was 
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sent only to Chicago addresses (the size was about 60 per cent of the 
second wave) in February 1984. The final total responses include 268 
cases from Chicago and suburbs (return rate 42.6 per cent) and 128 
from out of state (return rate 28.3 per cent). The total analyzable 
cases reached 344 (36.8 per cent of the total initial samples). 
2. Representativeness of the Sample 
a. Comparison with the 1980 U.S. Census Data: Because of the 
nature of the sampling method, it is necessary to check to what extent 
the current sample represents the population. The mean ages and edu-
cational attainments of the Koreans in the 1980 Census and in the cur-
rent sample are not significantly different. Also, occupational char-
acteristics are similar when job-categories are collapsed into white-
collar, blue-collar, and others. But income categories are much dif-
ferent between the two sets of data (Appendix II.2). 
b. Variance within the sampling clusters: Since the data were 
gathered from three large clusters with the assumption that each 
cluster represented certain local demographic characteristics, it is 
necessary to check if the samples from different clusters can be con-
sidered as parts of the same population. 
The respondents in the three-cluster samples shared the same 
characteristics in terms of age and education and almost the same in 
occupation. But income distribution and years of sojourn are differ-
ent across the locality. Most of the cases in the sample could be 
analyzed as a whole, while it may be necessary to control the effects 
of occupation, income, and years of sojourn in this country (Appendix 
II.3). 
CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN AMERICANS 
A. Historical Background of the Korean Immigrants. 
Korea was the last nation in Far East to open her doors to the 
United States by signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1882. 
The history of Korean immigration began in 1903, when 101 Koreans (in-
cluding 21 women and 25 children) arrived at the Hawaiian sugar-cane 
farms as laborers. By 1905 a total of 7,226 Koreans had immigrated 
to Hawaii but then large migrations stopped until the late 1960s. 
The first factor in this cessation of Korean immigration is the 
U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, which grew out of the Quota Act of 1921 
and was known as the Oriental Exclusion law. These acts limited non-
European immigration, and especially Asians, who were entitled only to 
a quota of under 100 per country per year until around the end of World 
War II. All Asians were generally forbidden to become naturalized U.S. 
citizens until the passage of Walter-McCarran Act of 1952. 
Another factor which blocked Korean immigration was the Japanese 
annexation of Korea in 1910. Under the 36 years of Japanese colonial 
rule, almost no Koreans (except about 1,100 "picture brides") were al-
lowed to emigrate to America. In fact, fewer than 900 students, and 
political refugees came to America during that period(l910-1945). 
At the end of the World War II, Korea was divided along the 38th 
parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union. The historical 
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division of this country was discussed in the Potsdam Conference 
in July, 1945, and materialized as General Order No.1, drafted on 
August 11 by the United States, as the terms of Japanese surrender 
in Korea. 
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The four big powers (The United States, the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain, and China) wanted a military trusteeship in Korea but the 
Koreans struggled for an independent government, both in the South 
and the North. Being unable to solve the dispute among themselves and 
manipulated by the foreign powers, two separate elections were held, 
resulting in two governments in 1948. This election was the first ex-
perience of democratic political process for Koreans. 
The invasion of the South by the Russian-backed North Koreans in 
June, 1950, became a three-year civil war. The futile war between the 
South and North Koreans involving the United Nations forces and Red 
Chinese forces ended in July, 1954, leaving the country still divided. 
Since then, North Korea has never been friendly to the United States 
and the two countries have no formal relationship. Therefore, Korean 
immigrants to the United States are all from South Korea, although some 
of them had fled from the North during the Korean War. 
Before the Immigration Act of 1965, during the interim period 
(from the Korean War to 1964), thousands of Korean brides of American / 
servicemen and orphans arrived in the United States. During the period 
of 1950-1975, a total of 28,205 Korean war brides arrived in the U.S., 
while 6,293 Korean orphans arrived between 1955-1966 through adoption 
(Hurh and Kim, 1984). 
Few of the earlier immigrants, however, reached the Midwest and 
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almost none of them survived here. The so-called "old timers" are the 
few oldest sojourners and the students who came around the end of 
World War II, and the hundreds of students who came before the new 
immigration act (1951-64). 
The war brides of the U.S. servicemen or those who had inter-
racial marriages have been isolated from later Korean immigrant groups. 
Only a small portion of those Korean wives of Americans who came after 
1965 seem to be trying to become partially integrated with Koreans 
among the mass immigration group. 
The adopted Korean-born children (during the 1950s) have almost 
become lost to the Korean community in the U.S. About 46 percent of ./ 
them were hybrid white American-Koreans, 41 percent were pure Koreans, 
and the rest were hybrid black American-Koreans (Huhr,1972). Not much 
information is available about them. But recently the adopting Ameri-
can parents of the pure-Korean orphans are searching for ties with the 
Korean communities in large cities to educate their adopted children to 
be aware of their heritages and find their own unique ethnic identity. 
Therefore, the Korean communities in the Midwest are mainly the 
communities of later immigrants (post-1960s) mixed with the small num- I j 
ber of the "interim period" student group, who tend to be considered 
elite members of the Korean communities. 
The majority of constituents of the Midwestern Korean communi-
ties-arrived in the United States as the doors were opened by the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act Amendments of 1965. This law lifted 
the quota limits for the nationals of the Eastern Hemisphere and adop-
ted a preference system which assigns a certain portion of anriual im-
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migration quotas to family reunion and to those who can fit into the 
American labor market segments where manpower is short. 
As a result, the Asian share of total immigration to the U.S. 
grew from 7.6 percent (1961-65) to 27.4 percent (1969-73), equaling 
the European share for the first time in American history. The Korean 
share of the total U.S. immigration increased from 0.7 percent to 3.8 
percent during that eight-year period. 
Annual Korean immigration numbers exceeded 10,000 by 1971, and 
their annual numbers have been maintained above 30,000 since 1976. In 
terms of annual immigration numbers, Korea is the third largest sup-
plier of immigrants after Mexico and the Philippines (Table IV.1). 
Even among the new Korean immigrants (since 1965), the demo-
graphic configuration has changed drastically over the 20 year period. 
Because of the preference system used in issuing immigration visas, 
about 75 percent of the Korean immigrants during the 1964-68 period 
were professionals, most being physicians, nurses, or scientists and 
Table IV.1. Number of Korean Immigrants to the U.S. 
Year Immigrants Year Immigrants Year Immigrants 
1970 9,314 1980 32,320 
1971 14,297 1981 32,633 
1972 18,876 1982 31,724 
1973 22,930 1983 33,339 
1964 2,362 1974 28,028 
1965 2,165 1975 28,362 
1966 2,492 1976 30,803 
1967 2,956 1977 30,917 
1968 3,811 1978 29,288 
1969 6,045 1979 29,248 
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Reports 
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technicians. But professional immigration declined noticeably after 
the mid-1970s. Before a minor revision of the immigration law in 1976, 
the preference system favored professionals over the family reunion 
provisions (60 per cent of available quota for professionals vs. 40 
per cent for family reunions). But this proportional preference was 
reversed in 1976, allowing 60 per cent for family reunion and 40 per 
cent for professionals (Keely, 1980). 
This change of rule reflects the demands of the U.S. labor market. 
By 1974-76 the United States was becoming self-sufficient in the pro-
f essional field but needed more people who could fill in the marginal 
labor markets. Therefore, instead of those professional immigrants who 
could compete in the middle-upper labor market on their own merits, 
their adult brothers and sisters and the families of the latter were 
brought in to fill the nonskilled labor markets. And the later group 
invited their aging parents who had grown out of their wage-earning 
ages. 
Because the permanent residents (legal immigrants) can be nat-
uralized in five years and attain new privileges, such as the right to 
file petitions for immigration of their nonimmediate relatives, the 
demographic characteristics of the Korean communities are rapidly 
changing over a short period of time. 
B. Demographic Description of Korean-Americans. 
The 1980 Census enumerated 354,593 people in the U.S. (24,351 
in Illinois) whose national origin is Korea. But according to the 
Korean government (Passport Office), the number has reached 80Q,OOO, 
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and estimates by leaders of the Korean-American communities in large 
U.S. cities are about three times higher than the Census numbers. For 
example, in the Los Angeles area, the Korean community claims a quarter 
of a million population, Greater New York Koreans claim 120,000, and 
Chicago area cognoscenti claim 70,000. The Washington D.C. and San 
Francisco areas each claim 50,000 Koreans. 
1. Age, Sex, and Marital Status 
As in most other Korean surveys (Huhr and Kim, 1984,b), males 
showed a higher response rate (68.7 per cent) than females (31.3 per 
./ 
cent) to the current survey. However, according to 1980 Census, the 
Korean community of the Chicago SMSA has more females(53.7 per cent) 
than males (46.3 per cent). The higher response rate from males in 
surveys, as in social activity in general, reflects the Korean culture 
still dominated by males. 
The majority of Korean-Americans are very young. Their median 
age in nation-wide census is 26.1 years but is 26.9 years in Illinois 
(Table IV.2). Among the five major Asian-American groups in Illinois, 
the Koreans are the youngest. The Japanese have the highest median age 
(32.1 years), followed by the Filipinos (30.2 years), the Indians (28.9 
years), and Chinese (28.7 years), with the median age of Illinois' total 
population being 29.9 years. 
The mean age of the current sample is 40.9 years and the median 
age is 40 years (minimum 22 years, maximum 82 years). Considering 
that all those who reported their ages are over 20 years old and this 
sample was taken three-and-a-half years after the 1980 Census, the age 
distributions of the current sample and that of the 1980 Census show 
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very similar patterns. If the age group under 19 years is excluded 
from the Census, and the three-and-half year lapse is calculated, 
these two age distributions peak (mode) at 39.0 years (Illinois) and 
41.7 years (current sample), respectively. More than four-fifth of 
the Koreans in Illinois (84.8 per cent) and of the current sample 
1 
(83.8 per cent) are in the age category of 20 to 49 (Table IV.3). 
Table IV.2. Age Distribution of Koreans 
National Illinois 
Total Persons 354,593 24,351 
under 9 years 80,502 6,069 
10 - 19 II 59,958 3,569 
20 - 29 II 63,212 * 29.52 % 4,100 * 27.87 % 
30 - 39 II 75,531 * 35.27 5,812 * 39.50 
40 - 49 II 44,752 * 20.90 2,955 * 20.08 
50 - 59 II 16,022 * 7.48 866 * 5.89 60 - 69 II 9,536 * 4.45 728 * 4.95 70 and over 5,080 * 2.37 252 * 1.71 
sub total * 99.99 *100.0 
median age 26.1 26.9 
* (% 20 years. or older ). Source: 1980 U.S. Census 
Table IV.3. Age by Sex ~Current SamEle2 
Age Male (%) Female (%) Row Total N Column % 
20 - 29 8.2 16.0 36 10.6 
30 - 39 32.2 50.0 128 37.8 
40 - 49 39.1 27.4 120 35.4 
50 - 59 12.9 3.8 34 10.0 
60 - 69 6.0 1.9 6 4.7 
70 and over 1. 7 0.9 5 1.5 
Total 233 (68.7) 106 (31.3) 339 100.0 
Mean Age=40.9 Median Age=40.0 Missing Cases=5 
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Most of the respondents in the current sample (89.2 %) are mar-
ried and divorce rate is very low (6.4 %), even though this sample is 
mostly represented by the age group which could be in a mid-life cri-
sis, indicating strong traditional family solidarity. 
2. Educational Achievement 
As has been reported (B.L. Kim, 1978c; Hurh et al., 1978; Huhr 
and Kim, 1984), the recent Korean immigrants are one of the highly 
educated ethnic groups. About two-thirds (62.8 per cent) of our res-
pendents have graduated from four-year colleges in Korea. In addition, 
more than a quarter (26.9 per cent) received some education in the U.S., 
with 21.3 per cent of the total respondents having received bachelor or 
higher degrees in the U.S. (Table IV.4). 
This educational achievement appears strikingly identical to 
the results of the 1980 U.S. Census, which shows that 61.9 per cent of 
Illinois' Koreans are college graduates. The proportion of high school 
Table IV.4 .Educational Attainment of the Respondents 
Education I (in Korea) Education II(in the U.S.) 
Level of Education N 
under Junior High 9 
High School Drop-out 7 
High School Graduation 68 
College Drop-out 37 
College Graduation 174 
Some Graduate Work 15 
Master's Degree 10 
Doctoral Degree 4 
No Answer 19 
Total 344 
% 
2.6 
2.0 
19.8 
10.8 
50.6 
4.4 
3.2 
1.2 
5.5 
100.0 
N 
1 
1 
2 
15 
16 
22 
24 
11 
8 
% 
0.3 
0.3 
0.6 
4.4 
4.7 
6.4 
7.0 
3.2 
2.3 
Respondents in the Education II are also included in the 
Education I. 
f 
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graduates (and higher) among Korean-Americans is 83.4 per cent in the 
1980 Census (Illinois) and 89.1 per cent in the current sample. Pro-
bably the respondents in the current sample are slightly more educated, 
because a newspaper readership survey attracts more responses from 
those who can read and enjoy reading. 
Table IV.S. .Educational Attainment of Koreans in Illinois 
Years of School Completed 
Male Female Total % 
Elementary 0 to 4 yrs 84 307 391 2.97 
5 to 7 yrs 79 481 560 4.26 
8 yrs 79 308 387 2.94 
High School 1 to 3 yrs 242 597 839 6.38 
4 yrs 862 1,968 2,830 21.53 
College 1 to 3 yrs 863 1,821 2,684 20.42 
4 yrs 3,434 2,021 5,455 41.49 
Total 13, 146 99.99 
% of High School Graduates 91.4 77.4 83.44 
Source: 1980 U.S. Census. 
3. Occupational Status 
Previous Korean surveys have revealed (Hurh and Kim, 1980) that 
about three-fourth of Koreans in the Los Angeles area were employed; 
similarly, 72.3 per cent of the respondents in the current sample are 
employed. More male respondents (82.3 per cent) are employed than 
females (49.5 per cent). The respondents to the current survey show a 
slightly higher employment rate than in the 1980 U.S. Census. In the 
Census, 69.4 per cent of Illinois' Korean males (over age 16) were in 
the labor force vs. 61.4 per cent for females. This employment rate 
is a little higher than that of Illinois' total population (Tables 
2 
IV.6 and IV.7). 
The first wave of Asian mass immigration with the post-1965 
Immigration Amendment was highly professional. Similarly in the 
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current sample, one-third (32.5 per cent) are in the professional and 
technical groupings, vs. 23 per cent of Illinois' Koreans in the 1980 
Census. The next most represented occupation in the current survey is 
proprietors (24.1 per cent), while the skilled or nonskilled factory 
workers had the second highest representation (25.8 per cent) in the 
1980 Census. The comparison supports the idea that the current sample 
Table IV.6. OccuEational Status of the Survex ResEondents 
ComEared with 1980 Illinois Census 
Occupations Current Survey Illinois Census 
N % N % 
1.Professionals(M.D., Professor, 
Scientist, Clergy etc.) 25 7.3 1,607 10.1 
2.Technicals (Nurses, 
Technicians etc.) 56 16.3 2,257 14.2 
3.Managerial (Corp.Managers, 
Public Officers, Salesmen) 12 3.5 551 3.5 
4.Clericals (Office Clerks, 
Assistants, Secretaries etc.) 9 2.6 974 6.1 
5.Skilled Labor (Factory Foremen, 
Mechanics etc.) 12 3.5 876 5.5 
6.Nonskilled Labor (Factory 
Assemblers) 14 4.1 2, 723 17.2 
7.Proprietors (Small Business) 60 17.4 985 6.2 
8.Service Workers (Janitorial, 5 1.5 571 3.6 
House Maid, etc.) 
9.0thers 56 16.3 
Unemployed 95 27.5 5,321 33.5 
Total 344 100.0 15,865 99.9 
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fairly represents the occupational status of the Koreans in Illinois 
census figures, except that there has been more representation from 
the self-employed proprietors. It might also indicate that during the 
three-and-half years since the 1980 Census more factory workers turned 
into small-business owners and more people completed training and then 
moved into white-collar professions. 
Table IV.7. Respondents' Occupation by Sex 
Occupations Male: N % Female: N % Row Total % 
Professional 25 10.5 0 0 25 7.3 
Technical 41 17.3 15 14.0 56 16.3 
Managerial 47 19.8 13 12.l 60 17.4 
Clerical 10 4.2 2 1.9 12 3.5 
Skilled Worker 4 1. 7 5 4.7 9 2.6 
Nonskilled Worker 12 5.1 0 0 12 3.5 
Proprietor 12 5.1 2 1.9 14 4.1 
Service Worker 2 0.8 3 2.8 5 1.5 
Others Employed 42 17.7 14 13.1 56 16.3 
Unemployed 42 17.7 53 49.5 95 27.6 
There are some indications that for Koreans the length of resi-
dence in the United States is positively related to higher occupation-
al status (Gamma=.20). Most of the selected professionals (87.5 per ' 
cent) have lived longer than six years in this country, while 81.6 per 
cent of the nonskilled workers have lived in this country for less 
than five years. And among the self-employed small business group, 
71.7 per cent have lived in his country for longer than five years. 
4. Income Ranks 
The average combined annual family gross income of the current 
(1983) sample is $35,788 (minimum $4,000, maximum $300,000). -This is 
42 
much higher than the median income for all Illinois' families ($22,746 
in 1980) and for white families ($23,999). But the median family in-
come of Koreans in the 1980 Census ($20,485) is lower than the above 
figures. Although inflation during the three-year time lapse is con-
sidered, the current sample seems to have drawn more respondents from 
higher income groups. If it is true that people state income moder-
ately in public reports but inflate it when talking to fellow Koreans, 
the census income statistics may be incorrect. This tendency has been 
mentioned by accountants or real-estate salesmen in the community. 
Age has no relationship to high income among the current Korean 
respondents, but the type of occupation and length of sojourn in 
3 
this country are positively related. Professionals and technicians 
may well earn high salaries, but it is the small-business operators 
who are doing best among all occupational groups in the Korean commu-
nity. The current data clearly support speculations in the community 
that small-business operators are the best-off among Koreans. 
The existence of status inconsistency in a mid-age group who are 
highly educated and financially well-off but unsatisfied with their 
Table IV.8. Income Status of the Respondents 
Income Level ($) N % 
under 15,000 37 10.5 
16,000 - 25,000 82 23.9 
26,000 - 35,000 72 21.0 
36,000 - 50,000 57 16.7 
over 50,000 96 28.0 
Total 344 100.0 
/ 
! 
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social positions may have many implications for political potential. 
According to Kim and Hurh's study of Chicago's Southside (1984, b), 
(mostly Black and I.atino areas) businesses, 60.7 per cent of Korean 
small-business people are college graduates. While the proprietors \/" 
are well educated like other Koreans in general, and so have high 
achievement motivation, they cannot find satisfying positions in the 
occupational strata in America, perhaps because of language barriers 
and lack of know-how, or because of discrimination • 
Although they have achieved some success in monetary terms in 
their businesses, they are trying to find more meaning in their lives, 
because with their high educational attainments they do not want mere-
ly to end up as 'mom-and-pop' shop merchants in black or Latino areas. 
'Ibis sense of status discrepancy (Y. Lee, 1978) may have a potential 
for political action. 
NOTES 
1. A similar age distribution was also found in Studies of 
Korean Small Business of Southside Chicago (Kim and Huhr,1984,b). 
The average age of the 94 respondents of their study is 39.8 years 
(ranging from 21 to 50). 
2. In the 1980 census, only 63.9 per cent of males of all races 
were in the labor force vs. 51.6 per cent of all females. Although 
the Census statistics included teen-age (over age 16) unemployment, 
and the current survey does not, both Korean males and females have a 
higher employment rate than do average Illinois residents. 
3. For example, the proportion of those who earned more than 
$50,000 a year is· 79.1 % for selected professionals, 64.3 % for tech-
nical, 58.4 % for managerial, 33.3 % for clerical, 50 % for skilled 
workers, 35.7 % for nonskilled, 81.6 % for proprietors, 20 % for the 
service workers, and 64.3 % cent of others. 
CHAPTER V 
AUTHORITARIANISM, ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION 
AND POLITICAL EFFICACY 
A. Authoritarianism 
In this chapter, we shall explore the extent of authoritarian 
characters, organizational involvement, and their relationship with 
political efficacy among the respondents. 
With the six items selected to measure mainly authoritarian 
aggression and submissiveness, the Koreans in the current sample 
expressed more authoritarian aggression-submission on three out of 
the four items than did Americans (compared with the American sample 
in the National Election Studies by SRC, 1972-76). And Koreans showed 
less egalitarianism in the two items than did Americans (Table V.1). 
The strong support for women's political participation, in 
contrast to the strong agreement with most of the authoritarian items, 
was somewhat unexpected. It may partially indicate that egalitarian 
values in gender roles are being inculcated among Korean-Americans. 
Korea has been a male-dominant society, where the female's main role 
is being a faithful housewife. But in the immigrant families wives' 
participation in the labor market and the inevitable sharing of house-
hold chores with their husbands seem to be bringing some changes in 
the balance of authority into the family (Kim and Huhr, 1984 a.). 
However, the cross-tabulations among authoritarianism items reveals 
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Table V.1 Comparison of Responses to Six Authoritarian Items 
Among Koreans and Americans 
Items Koreans Americans 
(Current Sample) (1972 Election Studies) 
1. What young people need most is strict parental discipline. 
Agree 193 (56.3 %) 1,003 (76.0 %) 
Disagree 86 (25.0 ) 287 (21. 7 ) 
Undecided 53 (15.5. ) 12 ( 0.9 ) 
No Answer 12 ( 3.2 ) 18 ( 1.4 ) 
2.Women should stay out of politics. 
Agree 58 (16.9 ) 219 (16.8 ) 
Disagree 209 (60.8 ) 1,082 (81.9 ) 
Undecided 69 (20.1 ) 10 ( 0.7 ) 
No Answer 8 ( 2.2 ) 9 ( 0.6 ) 
3.Science has limits and may be wrong. 
Agree 236 (68.6 %) 641 (48.6 %) 
Disagree 23 ( 6.7 ) 605 (45.8 ) 
Undecided 55 (16.0 ) 61 ( 4.6 ) 
No Answer 30 ( 8.7 ) 13 ( 1.0 ) 
4.People should pay more attention to new ideas. 
Agree 89 (84.0 %) 880 (66.7 %) 
Disagree 28 ( 8.1 ) 386 (29.2 ) 
Undecided 16 ( 4.7 ) 40 ( 3.0 ) 
No Answer 11 ( 3.2 ) 14 ( 1.1 ) 
5.Equality has gone too far in this country. 
Agree 144 (41.9 %) 553 (41.9 %) 
Disagree 91 (26.5 ) 681 (51.6 ) 
Undecided 89 (25.8 ) 72 ( 5.5 ) 
No Answer 20 ( 5.8 ) 14 ( 1.0 ) 
6.All but the handicapped and old should take care of themselves. 
Agree 256 (74.4 %) 603 (45.7 %) 
Disagree 55 (16.0 ) 684 (51.8 ) 
Undecided 22 ( 6.4 ) 24 ( 1.8 ) 
No Answer 11 ( 3.2 ) 11 ( 0.7 ) 
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that egalitarian value preferences are associated with authoritarian 
1 
aggression. 
The strong support (84 per cent) for the "openness to new ideas" 
(item 4) was somewhat unexpected because authoritarianism has been 
viewed to be associated with conservative orientations. The frequency 
distribution indicates that Koreans are highly authoritarian in sub-
mission-aggression orientation but are very much open to new values. 
This seems to contradict the original hypothesis about the rigidity 
(conventionalism, superstitiousness, and stereotyping) of authorita-
rian personality (Adorno et al.,1950); and also not compatible with 
the assumptions of the researchers who found close association between 
authoritarianism and dogmatism or conservatism (Rokeach, 1956 & 1967). 
A close examination of the current data revealed that the "openness to 
new ideas" item also has a strong relationship with aggression/submis-
2 
sion items. This may indicate that those who are open to new ideas are 
susceptible to suggestion in the name of "the new." Also, authorita-
rians may support egalitarian values as a function of aggression or 
susceptibility to "new ideas." 
Table V.2. Pearson Correlation Among 6 Items 
item 1 item 2 item 3 item 4 item 5 item 6 
youth women science ideas equality welfare 
item 1 1.00 
item 2 -.09 1.00 
item 3 0.22 0.31 1.00 
item 4 0.35 0.39 0.51 1.00 
item 5 0.17 0.10 0.32 0.27 1.00 
item 6 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.47 0.33 1.00 
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However, "openness to new ideas" may not reflect psychological 
disposition alone. Inkeles argues that "openness to new experience" 
is a part of modernity syndrome, a complex and diffuse personal qual-
ity manifested in attitudes, values, and behaviors. Evne the permis-
siveness of women's rights is a part of the modernity syndrome (1974, 
p.109, 291). We cannot affirm that psychological disposition stands 
alone as the indicator of "openness to new ideas" or "permissiveness 
of women's rights." 
The intercorrelations among the six authoritarian items is not 
high, and item 2 (women's political participation) and item 5 (against 
too much equality) have negative or weak relationships with the other 
four items (Table V.2). A reliability test shows that the Alpha co-
3 
efficient among the six items is 69.5. The Authoritarianism Index, 
constructed on the basis of cumulative scores of the six items into a 
unidimensional measure as originally planned, did not work out despite 
numerous computations. This index showed no significant differences 
between male and female respondents in the dependent variables, nor 
in other major variables such as Organizational Index. 
If we accept the criticisms that Adorno's F-scale measures only 
authoritarianism on the right (E. Shils, 1954) and sets up a false di-
chotomy without specifying authoritarians on the left (Knutson, 1972), 
then item 2 (openness to women's political participation) and item 4 
(openness to new ideas) seem to be measuring a liberal-conservative 
dimension in addition to aggression-submission. 
Rokeach suggests that authoritarians may conform to whatever in-
stitutional norms which prevail, even those advocating egalitarianism. 
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He cites that in Israel highly dogmatic subjects rank equality higher, 
while in the U.S. dogmatists rank equality lower (1973, pp.114-15). 
Clear arguments for the inclusion of the left and center in the 
analysis of political extremism can be found in the review of politi-
cal history by Lipset et al. (1960). Also, C. Bay (1970, p. 206) 
gives a rationale as to why authoritarians can be both conservative 
and liberal. 
Therefore, in the current research, liberalism/conservatism is 
taken as another dimension of personality traits, with an assumed 
close association with authoritarianism. Although there is some con-
ceptual weakness with the limited number of authoritarian items, and 
there is no way to determine to what extent the six items are measur-
ing psychological dispositions vs. cultural values, the Authoritarian-
ism Index constructed of four items and the Liberalism Index made of 
two items emerged as the best choices from the current data (see Appen-
dix I.5 for index construction). 
B. Participation in Voluntary Organizations 
Organizational membership of the respondents is largely limited 
to Korean ethnic organizations, with Korean churches dominating and 
very few joining American organizations. Sixty-three per cent of the 
respondents have at least one organizational membership, while 37 perj 
cent have no membership in any organization (Table V.3). More than 
two-thirds (68.2 per cent) do not hold any positions as officers in 
those organizations and 31.8 per cent hold one such position (Table 
V.4.). Less than one-fourth (22.7 per cent) participate frequently 
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in organizational meetings, while 56.3 per cent do not participate at 
all (Table V.5.). 
The current data support the findings by Huhr and Kim (1978) /,~ 
about the high ethnic organization involvement by Korean immigrants in 
the U.S. They interpreted the high ethnic organizational involvement 
by Koreans as an indication of ethnic confinement and saw this as a 
4 
mode adaptation of immigrants ('adhesive adaptation'). 
The degree of organization involvement varies widely depending on 
the types of organizations; 33.8 per cent have memberships in church-
related organizations with 19.5 per cent holding offices in these org-
anizations. Frequent participation is also highest in church-related 
organizations. The next most popular organization is college alumni 
Table V.3. Organization Memberships 
Number of Orgs. 
Belong to cases per cent 
none 127 37.0 % 
one 109 31.8 
two 55 15.7 
three to six 53 15.5 
Total 344 100.0 
Table V.4. Organization Office Holders 
Number of Positions cases per cent 
none 234 68.2 % 
one 74 21.6 
two to six 36 10.2 
Total 344 100.0 
I 
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associations with a membership rate of 22.4 per cent. Although the 
.·/ 
Korean Association has been recognized as the most inclusive organiza-
tion and the provincial organizations claim the most basic communal 
ties with the old homeland, affiliations to these organizations are 
very low (Table V.6.). 
Authoritarianism is not significantly related to organization 
involvement except that liberals hold slightly more organizational 
offices than conservatives (Gamma= -.17). Organizational involvement 
(in membership) is lower among females(Gamma= -.21) and highest among 
Table.V.5. Organization Participation 
Degree of 
Participation 
of ten 
occasionally 
not at all 
Total 
cases 
78 
73 
193 
344 
Table V.6. Affiliation by 
(in per 
Types of orgs. member 
provincial 5.8 
high school alumni 14.9 
college alumni 22.4 
church related 33.8 
service oriented 8.7 
professional 14.3 
Korean Association 13.7 
others 7.9 
Types of 
cent) 
officer 
0.3 
4 .1 
6.4 
19.6 
6.4 
4.4 
3.5 
3.2 
per cent 
22.7 % 
21.0 
56.3 
100.0 
Organizations 
frequent attendance 
0.9 
6.1 
8.5 
33.5 
7.6 
7.9 
5.5 
5.0 
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the age group in their 40s (60 per cent), followed by the age group 
in their 30s (46.1 per cent). Educational attainment (Gamma=.18) and 
occupational status are significantly related to organizational member-
ship (Gamma= -.30). Better-educated professionals are more likely be 
to involved in organizations than less educated or blue-collar workers. 
Naturalized U.S. citizens have higher organizational involvement (Gam-
ma= .34) than alien residents. Years of residence in the U.S. is posi-
tively related to organizational involvement (Gamma=.32). 
C. Political Efficacy 
The concept of political efficacy has been present in most the-
ories and researches of political participation for the last 30 years. 
However, the concept and measure of political efficacy suffer from 
major shortcomings. 
In the civic culture of Almond and Verba (1963, 16), political 
culture has three dimensions (cognitive, affective, evaluative) and 
four different objects as political actors (system as general object; 
personal input object; system output object; and self as civic object). 
But the researchers who followed the Survey Research Center (especially 
the three-wave panel Election Study of 1972-74-76) have focused on the 
affective orientation toward the self and the system as political actors. 
The efficacy variables of the SRC researches are centered on internal 
efficacy, external efficacy, and political trust which rougly corres-
pond to input affect, output affect and system affect of the original 
design of Almond and Verba (S. Craig, 1979, Abramson, 1983). These 
three variables have independent roots and do not appear closely inter-
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wined although they are the measures of diffuse support for the poli-
tical system (Iyengar, 1980). There is a trend toward reducing the 
questionnaire items to the minimum, and some researchers do not dis-
tinguish between internal and external efficacy (Abramson, 1983). 
The current study adopted the variables close to the original 
design by Almond and Verba. In the present chapter we shall deal with 
the generalized attitudes (affective orientation in particular) toward 
(a) the political system as a whole, its virtues and accomplishments 
(system affect); (b) the feelings of individuals toward themselves 
being subject to the civic duties (civic affect); (c) the expectations 
people have of treatment at the hands of government officials (output 
affect); and (d) the feelings people have about those governmental 
agencies as well as their ability to influence the enactment of poli-
cies (input affect). 
1. System Affect 
Almond and Verba, in their original study (1963) of civic culture, 
measured responses on 10 different aspects of system affect. In the 
current survey, only four out of those items were chosen (for brevity, 
by eliminating the items which are not suitable for the Koreans) and 
were constructed into the System Affect Index (see Appendix I.3.a). 
About two-thirds of the current sample has high system affect. 
This result shows that Koreans (in America) have higher system affect, 
when compared with other national or ethnic samples, such as Japanese-
6 
Americans or the Western five nations. Sixty-three per cent of our 
Korean-Americans (including non-citizens) have a high regard for the 
democratic political system of the U.S. The social welfare system, 
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economic system, and the technology-military power of America are 
respected in more than two-thirds of the current sample (Table V.7). 
The relatively high esteem for the American governmental system 
7 
has solid roots in the history of Korea (the South Korean Republic). 
Through the past century of mutual contact, Koreans (of the South) have 
always perceived Americans as wealthy, strong, and friendly, even as a 
rescuer in crises like the Korean War or in internal political tumoil. 
And broad cultural graftings with the United States after World War II 
have greatly contributed to the formation of high system affect of this 
immigrant group for the U.S. and its political system. 
Table V.7. Confidence in the U.S. Political System 
by Korean Respondents 
Aspects of degree of pride and respect 
U.S.Government 
very much somewhat not at all missing 
democracy 63.0 % 27.7 % 4.1 % 5.2 % 
social welfare 60.3 31,5 3.2 5.0 
economy 72.0 20.1 3.2 4.7 
industry/defense 68.8 22.4 3.2 5.5 
total 
100.0 % 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
The examination of the System Affect Index reveals that females 
have a slightly higher system affect than do males (Gamma=.14) and the 
better-educated respondents have a weaker system affect (Gamma=-.24). 
Age and citizenship status do not make any difference in system affect, 
although the length of residence in the U.S. has a weak positive rela-
tionship to system affect. 
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2. Civic Affect 
Civic affect is the affective orientation toward oneself as a 
political object. It comprises one's feelings of being obliged to per-
form citizen's duties in the political system and feelings of capabi-
lity to handle such obligations. Although civic affect is one of the 
four political orientations in Almond and Verba's original concepts, 
it has been gradually eliminated as the efficacy measures got simpler. 
The current respondents' sense of civic duty is very low. Of the 
four selected items, the most satisfying civic duty is voting, yet only 
41 per cent of the respondents would vote with satisfaction, and 37 per 
cent would serve on a jury with satisfaction. Only 18 per cent felt 
satisfied with paying taxes and 11 per cent with registration for mili-
tary draft for themselves or for their sons. 
On the Civic Affect Index (Appendix I.3.b), only 31.1 per cent 
showed high civic affect. Females have lower civic affect than do males 
(Gamma=-.30). Educational attainment (Gamma=.17) and age have weak 
positive relationship with civic affect. Those who have lived longer 
in the U.S. and naturalized citizens are more likely to accept civic 
duties than are alien residents (Gamma=.18). However, civic affect 
Table V.8.Civic Affect(Sense of Citizen's Duty) 
satisfied do as duty feel annoyed missing total 
pay taxes 17.5 % 74.1 % 4.1 % 4.4 % 100.0 % 
vote 41.4 37.0 6.1 15.5 100.0 
serve on jury 37.3 28.3 15.2 19.2 100.0 
draft registration 11.1 59.5 11. 7 17.8 100.0 
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seems not to be a function of length of exposure to the demand of civic 
duties. Among low and moderate civic affect groups, those who have lived 
longer in the U.S. tend to express more civic affect than those who have 
lived here only briefly. But among the high civic affect group, years 
of residence in the U.S. do not make any difference. 
Although Koreans have been educated to cherish a deep sense of 
civic duty (taxation, national defense, and education are three such 
basic duties in Korea), it seems that their civic affect has not been 
fully transferred to the new adopted country (Table V.8.). 
It is also possible that the respondents, having escaped from 
the external constraints of the homeland which continuously demanded 
loyalty, harmony and national consolidation (so-called Gook-Min-Chong-
Wha), are now experiencing a vacuum in their sense of of civic duties 
in a more voluntaristic system. In Korea, tax officers visit homes 
to collect taxes, nonvoters are informally sanctioned, military draf-
tees are preregistered through vital records, and jury selection is 
not open to the public. A cultural transition from such a background 
takes time. 
3. Input Affect 
Another dimension of political competence is the input affect 
or internal efficacy which denotes one's belief and feelings that he 
can exercise some influence in the course of governmental decisions. 
It makes a great difference in one's political participation whether 
someone has a clear view of the channels open to him for expressing 
his point of view or has not even the vaguest notion of what he can do. 
In order to detect the respondents' input affect, the respond-
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ents were asked which strategies they would choose in order to change 
the legislature at local or federal levels and how confident they were 
about achieving their goals. Because the Korean government has no 
differentiation between local and federal levels and the respondents 
have little sense of such differentiation, they were treated as a sin-
gle entity in the current study. 
For the Korean respondents in the current survey, voting is the 
most preferred strategy of input to the government. Voting was chosen 
by 49.4 per cent of the respondents, but 25.5 per cent would choose 
other strategies in addition to voting (the respondents were allowed 
to make more than one choice). 
Considering that one fifth would do nothing and that 23.9 per 
cent would depend on voting alone, almost half of the respondents seem 
to be passive in the process of political inputs, although 79 per cent 
would do something. 
Koreans are less likely to act with other people, or through 
groups or formal organizations. Only 13 per cent would do that in 
Table V.9. Input Affect A. (Actions to be Taken) 
Actions to be taken to correct legislation N 
do nothing 66 
write or talk to politicians 32 
work through groups 41 
vote 75 
vote and other actions too 80 
protest activities 20 
Total 314 
More than one choice was allowed for this question. 
Missing cases=30 
Per Cent 
21.0 % 
10.2 
13.0 
23.9 
25.5 
6.4 
100.0 
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their input attempts, and directly contacting (writing or talking to) 
politicians was chosen by only 10 per cent of the Korean sample. This 
8 
rate is also lower than that for other national or ethnic samples. 
Intended protest activities as the form of their own expression of in-
put are chosen by 6.4 per cent, but this rate is much lower than their 
approval rate of others' protest activities. "Taking some violent 
action" or "just protest" are more likely to happen with Koreans than 
with other nationals. Also, even among those who would not involve 
themselves in protest, one-fourth approved such activities by others 
(further discussions in Chapter V). 
The feelings about the possibility of succeeding in these input 
efforts are moderately high among the respondents of the current study. 
Two-thirds feel they are likely to succeed in their attempts, while 
24 per cent believe it to be impossible (Table V.10). 
On the Input Affect Index (see Appendix I.3.c) only one-fourth 
(26.4 per cent) of the respondents showed high input affect. This rate 
is much lower than the rates of Americans but comparable to four other 
9 
Western nationals. 
Table V.10 Input Affect B. (Possibility of Success) 
Likely to succeed in Influencing 
Very Likely 
Somewhat Likely 
Somewhat Impossible 
Absolutely Impossible 
Total 
Missing cases=41 
the change of regulations 
N % 
28 9.2 
193 63.7 
50 16.S 
32 10.6 
303 100.0 
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Age has a negative relationship to input affect(Gamma=-.10) and 
females have a lower input affect than do males (Gamma= -.28). The 
better-educated respondents have a higher input affect (Gamma=.16). 
Those who have lived longer in the U.S. have a significantly higher 
input affect than those who have lived more briefly in the U.S. (Gamma 
=.25), consequently, U.S. citizens have a higher input affect than do 
the resident aliens (Gamma=.32). 
4. Output Affect 
The feeling that people have toward governmental authorities 
may be inf erred from their expectations of how they will be treated 
by the government officials. The respondents were placed in two hypo-
thetical situations. They were asked to imagine themselves making 
inquiries to government officials on problems of different magnitude 
(such as tax questions, immigration problems, or police traffic tic-
ket). And they were asked if they could get equal treatment to any-
one else. Half the respondents (52.4 per cent) expected they would 
get equal treatment from government officials. This proportion is 
lower than among Americans; 90 per cent of whites and 49 per cent of 
Table V.11. Output Affect (Equal treatment from Authorities) 
N Per Cent 
Surely equal treatment 108 32.3 % 
I may get equal treatment 67 20.1 
It depends 71 21.3 
May be not 87 26.0 
They will ignore 1 0.3 
Total 334 100.0 
Treatment by government officials or police were combined. 
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blacks expected equal treatment by government officials; while 85 per 
cent of whites and 60 per cent of blacks expected equal treatment by 
the police (Abromowitz, 1980). Also, same expectations in the current 
sample are lower than what Almond and Verba found earlier in Western 
10 
nations sample (1963). The reason for such low expectation may have 
roots in the Korean political culture of a deep elite-mass gap (fur-
ther discussion in Chapter VII). 
On the second question, asking the respondents how seriously 
their points of view would be considered by authorities, a similar 
pattern emerged. Only 30.6 per cent of the current sample thought 
their opinions would be seriously considered by the officials. 
On the Output Affect Index (Appendix I.3.d), 45.5 per cent of 
all respondents showed high output affect. This rate seems to be 
higher than the proportion of high external efficacy among Americans 
(33.9 per cent in 1980 Election Study by ICPSR) but the two measure-
11 
ments are not identical. 
Males tended to have lower output affect than did females (Gamma 
Table V.12. Output Affect (Expectations toward Officials) 
N Per Cent 
They will seriously consider 100 30.6 % 
They will pay some attention 124 37.9 
Depends 91 27.8 
They will say nothing 3 0.9 
They will ignore 9 2.8 
Total 327 100.0 
Missing case=l7 
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=.18), and young respondents in their 20s had a lower ouput affect 
than their elders. Education was positively related to output affect 
(Gamma=.16) but occupational status and income were not linearly rel-
ated to ouput affect. The time of sojourn in the U.S. was positively 
related to output affect (Gamma=.28); consequently, naturalized U.S. 
citizens had higher output affect than resident aliens (Gamma=.21). 
D. Authoritarianism, Organizational Participation and 
Political Efficacy 
In the preceding section, we found that the Korean-American res-
pondents have high system affect, while having low input, output and 
civic affect. In this section we will examine whether their organi-
zational participation had any effect on their political efficacy with 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Among authoritarians, those who participate 
in voluntary organizations have higher political competence than 
authoritarians who do not participate in voluntary organizations, 
in terms of their affect about one's own position as a political 
subject, about one's ability to influence the political system, 
about the output responses by the political system and about the 
national political system as a whole. 
When authoritarianism is coded as a dichotomous variable, its 
relationships with system affect and civic affect appear clearly nega-
tive as postulated; but it does not vary much with output affect or 
with input affect. If the liberal/conservative dimension is examined 
simultaneously, the relationship between authoritarianism and input or 
output affect appears distinctively as postulated (Figure V.1). 
As was hypothesized, the data suggest that the Organizational 
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Index (Appendix I.2.c) has a modifying effect on the relationship be-
tween authoritarianism and political efficacy. Comparison of Gammas 
reveals the following patterns (Figure V.1. and Table V.13): 
i) Liberals who participate in organizations are more likely 
to have high political affect (except output affect) than nonpar-
ticipants whether they are authoritarian or not. 
ii) Conservative nonauthoritarians who participate in organi-
zations have high political affect on all four efficacy indices. 
Figure V.1. Authoritarianism and Political Affect (Gammas) 
-4 
Liberals 
-3 -2 -1 0 
-.01 =I 
-.13 ========! 
- • 20 =========! 
- • 24 ===========! 
I 
I 
I 
1 2 
system affect 
civic affect 
output affect 
input affect 
-.23 ===========! system affect 
3 4 
Conservatives -.18 ========! civic affect 
output affect !======== 0.17 
input affect !========== 0.20 
Tables.V.13. Organizational Index and Political Affect (Gammas) 
Liberal 
Nonauthoritarian 
Authoritarian 
Conservative 
Nonauthoritarian 
Authoritarian 
Political Affect 
System Civic Input 
.22 (.21) .18 (.27) .29 (.28) 
.16 (.18) .02 ( .07) .38 (.51) 
.76 (.80) .61 (.58) .34 (.35) 
-.11 (-.12) .04 (.08) .16 (.18) 
Output 
-.35 (-.22) 
-.16 (-.21) 
.44 (.44) 
.06 (.04) 
Gammas in parentheses are the strength of relationship with 
Organizational Membership, instead of with the Organizational Index. 
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But the increase in political efficacy is smaller among conserva-
tive authoritarians than nonauthoritarians. 
The above patterns of relationships are further explored con 
trolling organizational involvement: 
1. Authoritarianism and System Affect 
There is a weak negative relationship between authoritarianism 
and system affect (Gannna= -.10). Authoritarians have a lower mean 
system affect (2.52) than nonauthoritarians (2.62), supporting the 
general postulates. When the liberal/conservative dimension is con-
trolled, conservative authoritarians showed a lower system affect 
than nonauthoritarians but liberal authoritarians showed higher system 
affect than nonauthoritarians (Table V.14). 
Organizational participation generally increases system affect 
for the current respondents (Gamma=.15), especially for all liberals 
12 
and nonauthoritarian conservatives; organizational members have a 
higher mean system affect than nonmembers (Figure V.3a). 
As shown in Table V.15 in the case of liberal authoritarians, 
Table V.14. Authoritarianism and System Affect ( % ) 
System Affect Index 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Liberal 176 
Nonauthoritarian 8.0 38.0 54.0 100.0 ( 59) 
Authoritarian 8.5 29.3 62.2 100.0 (117) 
Conservative 116 
Nonauthoritarian 7.1 21.4 71.4 99.9 ( 42) 
Authoritarian 4.1 37.8 58.1 100.0 ( 74) 
Missing Cases=52/ Gamma for Liberal -.01/ for Conservative -.23 
63 
organizational participants are more represented in the moderate or 
high system affect category than nonorganizational respondents, clear-
ly in the direction of supporting Hypothesis 1. In the case of con-
servative authoritarians, the results are opposite to the current hypo-
thesis, for some unkown reason. 
Table V.15. Organization Involvement and System Affect 
System Affect (Per Cent) 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Liberal Authoritarian 
Organization Membership 
None 10.2 
One or Two 0 
More than Two 0 
Conservative Authoritarian 
Organization Membership 
None 6.1 
One or Two 5.0 
More than Two 0 
28.6 
41.5 
25.9 
30.3 
40.0 
47.6 
2. Authoritarianism and Civic Affect 
61.2 
58.5 
74.1 
63.6 
55.0 
52.4 
100.0 (N=49) 
100.0 (N=41) 
100.0 (N=27) 
100.0 (N=33) 
100.0 (N=20) 
100.0 (N=21) 
There is a weak negative relationship between authoritarianism 
and civic affect (Gamma= -.15). The mean civic affect of authoritari-
ans (2.27) is lower than that of nonauthoritarians (2.33), supporting 
the general postulates about authoritarianism (Table V.16). The nega-
tive relationship is upheld when the liberal/conservative dimension of 
authoritarianism is controlled (Gamma= -.13 for liberals and -.18 for 
conservatives, respectively). The mean civic affect of the conserva-
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tives (2.29) is not much different from that of the liberals (2.30). 
Those who were involved in organizations expressed a slightly 
higher civic affect than nonparticipants (Gamma=.13), although the 
difference of mean civic affect between organizational members and 
nonmembers is very small (Figure V.3b). 
The strength of the relationship between organizational member-
Table V.16. Authoritarianism and Civic Affect ( % ) 
Civic Affect Index 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Ll.beral 158 
Nonauthoritarian 3.8 60.4 35.8 100.0 ( 53) 
Authoritarian 2.9 68.6 28.6 100.1 (105) 
Conservative 109 
Nonauthoritarian 5.3 55.3 39.5 100.1 (38) 
authoritarians 0 73.2 26.8 100.0 (71) 
Missing Cases= 77/ Gamma for Ll.berals -.13/ Conservatives -.18 
Table V.17. Organizational Membership & Civic Affect ( % ) 
Civic Affect (in Per Cent) 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Ll.beral Authoritarians 
Organization Membership 
None 2.4 73.8 23.8 100.0 (N=42) 
One or Two 2.6 63.2 34.2 100.0 (N=38) 
More than two 4.0 68.0 28.0 100.0 (N=25) 
Conservative Authoritarians 
Organization Membership 
None 0 76.5 23.5 100.0 (N=34) 
One or Two 0 66.7 33.3 100.0 (N=18) 
More than Two 0 73.7 26.3 100.0 (N=l9) 
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ship and civic affect, measured by Gamma coefficients, is very weak. 
But the frequency distribution (Table V.17) clearly shows that orga-
nizational members have higher civic affect than nonmembers, even when 
13 
authoritarianism and liberal/conservatism are considered. 
Although the number of organizational memberships is not linearly 
related to civic affect, the data weakly confirm the direction of the 
relationship as stated in Hypothesis 1. 
3. Authoritarianism and Input Affect 
There is little difference of mean input affect between authori-
tarians (2.03) and nonauthoritarians (2.01), although authoritarians 
tended to show a slightly lower input affect than nonauthoritarians. 
The liberals had a slightly higher mean input affect (2.10) than the 
conservatives (1.92). But when the liberal/conservative dimension is 
controlled, liberal authoritarians showed lower input affect than non-
authoritarians (Gamma= -.24), while conservative authoritarians showed 
higher input affect than nonauthoritarians (Gamma=20). This pattern 
' supports the general postulates of authoritarianism in the case of 
liberal authoritarians, while conservative authoritarians showed a 
relationship opposite to such postulates (Table V.18). 
Organizational involvement significantly increases input affect 
for all respondents (Gamma=.30). Organizational members have higher 
mean input affect than nonmembers (Figure V.3c). The positive effect 
of organizational involvement is sustained for both authoritarians and 
nonauthoritarians alike, and regardless of their being liberal or con-
14 
servative. Among those who are highly involved in organizations, the 
proportion of high input affect is much higher and the proport2on of 
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low input affect is lower than among nonorganizational members (Table 
V.19). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported in the case of input affect. 
Especially with liberal authoritarians the hypothesized pattern appears 
clearly. 
4. Authoritarianism and Output Affect 
There is little difference in mean output affect between nonauth-
oritarians (2.17) and authoritarians (2.15). When the liberal/conser-
Table V.18. Authoritarianism and Input Affect ( % ) 
Input Affect 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Liberal 165 
Nonauthoritarian 14.8 50.0 35.2 100.0 ( 44) 
Authoritarian 22.5 54.1 23.4 100.0 (111) 
Conservative 111 
Nonauthoritarian 38.5 43.6 17.9 100.0 ( 39) 
Authoritarian 30.6 40.3 29.2 100.0 ( 72) 
Missing Cases= 68; Gammas, Liberal= -.24/ Conservative= .20 
Tables V.19. Organizational Membership & Input Affect ( % ) 
Input Affect (in Per Cent) 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Liberal Authoritarians 
Organization Membership 
None 32.6 56.5 10.9 100.0 (N=46) 
One or Two 23.7 55.3 21.1 100.1 (N=38) 
More than Two 3.7 48.1 48.1 99.9 (N=21) 
Conservative Authoritarians 
Organization Membership 
None 38.2 32.4 29.4 100.0 (N=34) 
One or Two 38.9 33.3 27.8 100.0 (N=l8) 
More than Two 10.0 60.0 30.0 100.0 (N=20) 
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vative dimension is controlled, liberal authoritarians tended to show 
lower output affect than nonauthoritarians, as in the general postula-
tion, but the opposite was true among the conservatives (Table V.20). 
Organizational involvement alone seems not to increase output 
affect, although there is a small difference in mean output affect 
between organizational members and nonmembers (Figure V.3d). When the 
liberal/conservative dimension was controlled, the relationship between 
Table V.20. Authoritarianism and Out:Eut Affect 
Output Affect 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Liberal 177 
Nonauthoritarian 27.6 32.8 39.7 100.1 ( S8) 
Authoritarian 34.S 32.8 32.8 100.1 (119) 
Conservative 120 
Nonauthoritarian 47.7 2S.O 27.3 100.0 ( 44) 
Authoritarian 34.2 27.6 38.2 100.0 ( 76) 
Missing Cases = 47: Gammas Liberal= -.20, Conservative=.17 
Table V.21. Organizational MembershiE & Out:Eut Affect ( % ) 
Output Affect 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Liberal Authoritarians 
Org. Membership 
None 30.0 30.0 40.0 100.0 (N=SO) 
One or Two 29.3 41.S 29.3 100 .1 (N=41) 
More than Two so.a 2S.O 2S.O 100.0 (N=28) 
Conservative Authoritarians 
Org. Membership 
None 38.9 2S.O 36.1 100.0 (N=36) 
One or Two 30.0 20.0 so.a 100.0 (N=20) 
More than Two 30.0 40.0 30.0 100.0 (N=20) 
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organizational involvement and output affect became clearly negative 
15 
among liberals but positive among conservatives. 
Although the strength of the relationship is too small to claim 
a clear-cut support for Hypothesis 1, the case of conservative auth-
oritarians shows a pattern that partially fits the hypothesis; but 
the case of the liberal authoritarians contradicts Hypothesis 1 as far 
as output affect is concerned (Table V.15). 
Summary 
On the six authoritarian items, Korean respondents showed a high-
er degree of authoritarian aggression, submissiveness, and anti-egali-
tarianism than Americans but the inter-correlations among the six items 
were not high. Authoritarian on the left and right should be identi-
fied because they manifested different traits. Organizational involve-
ment of the respondents was very high but limited to ethnic organiza-
tions, indicating ethnic confinement in structural assimilation. The 
data did not support the general assumption that authoritarianism is 
negatively related to organizational participation. 
Korean-Americans have a high regard for the U.S. governmental 
system and their system affect is higher than that shown among the 
samples of five Western nations (including the U.S.). On the contrary, 
their sense of citizens' duty being subject to the government (civic 
affect) is very low. This may be a result of their passive defiance 
(see Korean Political Culture in Chapter VII), inasmuch as they were 
accustomed to their homeland government which exercised many external 
constraints, and now they are in a vacuum of such constraints in this 
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voluntaristic society. 
Input affect is relatively low among the Korean-Americans. Almost 
half of the respondents feel passive about influencing governmental 
policies and Koreans are least likely to act with other people. Their 
trait of distrusting others, as a syndrome of authoritarianism, and 
their difficulty in working with other people may have contributed to 
their low input affect and also to low output affect. 
The time factor and citizenship are positively related to all 
items of political efficacy, indicating the progress of political ac-
culturation. The findings presented in this section can be summarized 
in the following points (Figure V.2.): 
i) The relationship between organizational involvement and 
political affect is stronger (even when negative) among nonautho-
ritarians than authoritarians on all four political affect items. 
Despite the effect of organizational involvement, authoritarians 
do have lower political efficacy than nonauthoritarians. 
ii) With liberal authoritarians, the hypothesized relationship 
that even authoritarians have higher political affect if they are 
involved in organizations was found with system affect and very 
weakly with civic affect, in addition it has been supported with 
input affect but not with output affect. 
iii) With conservative authoritarians, the hypothesized rela-
tionship was found with input affect, weakly with civic and output 
affect, except the case of system affect. 
The findings generally support the participationist thesis and 
also Hypothesis 1. The above pattern shows that the conservative 
authoritarians whom the original researchers of the F-scale (Adorno 
et al.) dealt with as authoritarians could have higher input and out-
put affect, contradicting their hypothesis. But the liberals whom 
they did not differentiate in their studies seem to fall in the res-
ponse patterns that they predicted. Therefore, it is only liberal 
authoritarians who are reacting as "alienated political subjects," 
while the conservative authoritarians remain as "allegiant partici-
pants" (Almond andVerba, 1963). 
Figure.V.2. Sununary: Authoritarianism, Organizational Involvement 
And Political Affects 
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Postulates 
Authoritarianism 
Hypotheses 
Org. Involvement 
Variance 
Explained 
System Affect 
Civic Affect 
Input Affect 
Output Affect 
supported 
supported 
supported 
(Liberals only) 
supported 
(Liberals only) 
NOTES 
supported 
(Liberals only) 
supported 
(weakly) 
supported 
not supported 
5.2 % 
6.7 % 
8.5 % 
9.3 % 
1. In the cross-tabulation between the item 2 and item 6, four-
fifths (79 %) of those who supported women's political participation 
agreed on authoritarian item 6 ("all but the handicapped and old should 
take care of themselves"), indicating that the majority of egalitarians 
are aggressive. And 65 % of the aggressive respondents (on item 6) 
supported women's political rights. In the cross-tabulation between 
item 2 and item 3 (science has its limitation), again 80 % of those 
who supported women's political rights express superstitiousness. And 
69 per cent of the superstitious respondents supported women's poli-
tical rights. 
2. Item 4 (openness to new ideas) is not only related to the 
egalitarian item (item 2; Gamma=.44) but also to aggressiveness/sub-
missiveness items. For instance, 92 % of those who expressed aggres-
siveness on item 1 support the openness to new ideas. And 62 per cent 
of the open-minded respondents on item 4 are highly aggressive on item 
1 (Gamma=.45). Item 4 has a very strong relationship (Ganuna=.80) with 
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item 3 (superstitiousness). It indicates that the respondents who 
agreed on these two items expressed susceptibility to suggestions by 
others and not only the openness to liberal ideas. Again the relation-
ship between item 4 and item 6 is very strong (Gamma=.65). In here, 
the 'open minded' respondents are more aggressive in claiming self-
support by the able-bodied. 
3. If the 30 missing cases are excluded, the Alpha coefficient 
is reduced to 46.1). 
4. Hurh and Kim found more intense ethnic confinement in Los 
Angeles area; ie. 76.1 % were participating in Korean organizations 
(78.6 % of them were affiliated with Korean churches), and only 0.5 
% were affiliated with American associations (1984, pp. 95-97). 
5. Labor unions were not included in the questionnaire and chu-
rch involvements were excluded from the computation of organization 
indices, because church membership was so prevalent and could have 
been duplicated with other memberships. 
6. Bunch's interview of 212 Japanese-Americans in Portland, 
Oregon, 1967 and D.B. Conradt's German data of 1978 can be compared 
as follows: 
High Regard for Political System (percentage) 
Korean-Americans Japanese-Americans 
Political System 
Social Legislation 
Economic System 
Contribution to Science 
63 % 
60 
72 
69 
65 % 
4 
34 
0 
Germans 
31 % 
18 
40 
23 
Although the measurements are not identical, political trust of 
the five Western nations surveyed in 1974 is much lower than Korean-
Americans' system affect. The proportion of high political trust 
among adults of the five nations is; 36% for the Netherlands, 20% for 
Great Britain, 23% for the U.S., 52% for Germany, and 51% for Austria 
(Jennings et al.,1979. 480). 
7. As mentioned in Chapter IV., North Korea has no formal rela-
tionship with the U.S. and cannot send immigrants to the U.S. Even 
those Koreans who fled from the North during or before the Korean War 
of the 1950s are considered as South Koreans. Therefore, the Koreans 
in this study exclude any possible immigrants from the North. 
8. "Acting with other people" was chosen with much higher rates 
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by Americans 30%; Germans 14 %; Dutch 16%; Japanese 15%; Austrians 3% 
(compiled by Conradt, 1980, p. 249); and British 18% (Kavanagh 1980, 
p. 150). 
9. The proportion of high and medium internal efficacy among 
the white Americans was 54% in 1978 and 55% in 1980 (Abramson, 1983, 
p. 185). The proportions of high (internal) efficacy among the five 
Western national adult samples of 1974 are as follows: Netherland 22%; 
Britain 22%; U.S. 41%; Germany 24%; Austria 5% (Alberbeck, 1979). 
10. The expectation of equal treatment by officials and police 
were also higher among the British, Germans and Italians than in the 
current Korean sample. Only Mexicans had lower output affect than 
did Koreans. Among the Mexicans, the positive expectation of equal 
treatment was 42% for government officials and 32 % for the police. 
11. Although input affect and internal efficacy are essentially 
the same variables, their measurements adopted are slightly different. 
In the Korean sample, the respondents with medium-high input affect 
were 45.5% of the total. 
12. Among liberal authoritarians, organizational members have 
higher system affect than those who do not have organizational member-
ship (Gamma=.16),as well as among liberal nonauthoritarians (Gamma= 
Among conservative authoritarians those involved in organiza-
tions have lower system affect (Gamma= -.11). But among the conserva-
tive nonauthoritarians, system affect is higher for the organizational 
members (Gamma=.76). · 
13. Among the nonauthoritarians, civic affect is higher for those 
who are involved in organizations both for liberals (Gamma=.18) and 
conservatives (Gamma=.61). Even among authoritarians, civic affect 
was slightly higher for organizational members, both for liberals 
(Gamma=.02) and conservatives (Gamma=.04). 
14. The positive relationship is stronger among liberal autho-
ritarians (Gamma=.38) than conservative authoritarians (Gamma=.16). 
Among nonauthoritarians, the positive relationship is relatively 
stronger for the conservatives (Gamma=.34) than for the liberals 
(Gamma=.27). 
15. Liberal organization members had lower output affect than do 
nonorganizational counterparts(Gamma= -.35 for nonauthoritarians, 
Gamma= -.16 for authoritarians). Conservatives who are organizational 
members had higher output affect than do the nonorganizational members 
(Gamma= .44 for nonauthoritarians, Gamma=.06 for authoritarians). 
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Figure.V.3b. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND CIVIC AFFECT (MEANS) 
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Figure.3.2c. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND INPUT AFFECT (MEANS) 
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CHAPTER VI 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ISSUE PREFERENCE 
A. Political Participation 
In the preceding chapter, we have examined the relationship be-
tween organizational participation and political efficacy. In general, 
higher political efficacy was found among respondents who participated 
in voluntary organizations, even among authoritarians. In this chap-
ter, we shall further examine whether such high political efficacy, 
presumably gained by organizational participation, can have an effect 
on political participation (namely in electoral process and protest 
activities) and on the political issue preferences of the respondents. 
Thus, the following hypothesis will be tested in this section: 
Hypothesis 2. Among authoritarians, those who participate in 
voluntary organizations and have higher political efficacy are 
more likely to participate in the electoral process than those who 
do not participate in voluntary organizations. 
Preliminary analysis of the data shows that Korean-Americans' 
participation on various levels of political action is very low. 
This was predicted because only 52.3 per cent of Korean-Americans are 
naturalized citizens, although the Asians' naturalization rate is high-
1 
est among the new immigrants. About two-thirds (61.7 per cent) of 
the 180 citizens among the respondents have registered for voting and 
48.3 per cent of these citizens voted in the congressional election in 
1982 and 37.8 percent did so in the local election of 1983. 
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The respondents' participation in the electoral process other 
than voting is relatively lower than voting and had to be collapsed 
into one response category (Table VI.1). However, nonvoting activit-
ies are a more active form of participation in the political process 
than voting because such participation requires more time, effort, and 
money than merely presenting oneself at the polling place on election 
day. There was a tendency for better-educated respondents with white-
collar jobs and with higher income to participate more in the politi-
cal processes other than voting. On the Political Participation Index 
(see Appendix I.4.a), authoritarianism has little effect (Gamma=.02). 
But the relationships between other key variables and the Political 
2 
Participation Index are confirmed as generally assumed. 
Table VI.1. Political Participation of Korean American Citizens 
(Comparison with U.S. Voting Rates) 
Types of activity Current Sample 
Voting: 82 Congress 
Voting: 83 Local 
Other Activities* 
48.3 
37.8 
24.1 
(N=l80) 
(N=180) 
(N=344)** 
U.S. Total Chicago City 
64.1 
82.0 
*Political discussion with politicians (N=25), rallies (N=17), 
campaign fund donation (N=33), and writing to media (N=8) etc. 
** Noncitizens are also involved in nonvoting political actions. 
1. Voting in Congressional and Local Elections 
About a quarter (25.9 per cent) of the total respondents voted 
in the 1982 congressional election. The total rate seems to be low; 
but if only the citizens are considered, voters' registration rate is 
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61.7 per cent and the actual voting rate of the registered voters is 
78.4 per cent (48.3 per cent of the 180 citizens). This seems to be-
lie the general perception that Korean-Americans are nonactive voters. 
Their registration and voting rate is lower than the U.S. average but 
3 
higher than that for Hispanics. Authoritarians voted slightly more 
in the congressional election than nonauthoritarians. But this rela-
tionship was very weak, while social status and sex had a greater ef f-
4 
ect on voting. 
The voting rate in the local election {Spring, 1983) is lower 
than that in the congressional election--only 37.7 per cent of citi-
zens voted. Authoritarians voted slightly less in the local election 
than nonauthoritarians, but the contrast is negligibly small (Gamma 
= -.08). Again, the variables of sex and social status had stronger 
5 
effects on voting in local elections. 
2. Organization Involvement, Political Affect, and Voting 
a. System Affect and Voting 
For all respondents with citizenship, system affect had a posi-
Table.VI.2. The Profiles of Voters in Elections 
(Gammas) 
Congressional Election 
More Males than Females: 
Better-Educated than less Educated. 
Mainly White-collar Employee Activity 
Have Lived Longer in the U.S. 
-.42 
.57 
-.33 
.40 
Local Election 
-.29 
.44 
-.21 
.14 
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tive relationship with voting in congressional and local elections. 
Those with higher system affect voted more in both elections, regard-
6 
less of their degree of authoritarianism. 
In the congressional election, authoritarians with system affect 
voted more for both liberals (Gamma=.25) and conservatives (Gamma=.20). 
The same relationships with similar strengths of association were found 
in the local elections (Table VI.3). 
When organizational involvement is controlled the following pat-
terns become apparent among the citizens (Table VI.4). 
i) Among liberal authoritarians, high system affect is posi-
tively related to voting in the congressional election if they are 
involved in organizations, but negatively related if they are not 
involved in organizations. 
Table VI.3. Authoritarianism Political Affect and Voting (Gammas) 
Voting in Congressional Elections 
Political Affect 
System Civic Input Output 
Liberals 
Nonauthoritarian .61 .23 -.02 -.17 
Authoritarian .25 .48 .24 .o 
Conservatives 
Nonauthoritarian .65 .58 .36 .09 
Authoritarian .20 .30 .26 .o 
Voting in Local Elections 
Liberals 
Nonauthoritarian .24 .o -.15 .01 
Authoritarian .25 .42 .28 -.06 
Conservatives 
Nonauthoritarian .17 .52 .32 -.27 
Authoritarian .29 .32 -.04 .03 
79 
ii) In the local election, the strength of the relationship 
between system affect and voting is stronger for the liberal auth-
oritarians involved in organizations than for nonorganizational 
members. 
iii) With the conservative authoritarians no such pattern was 
found. 'Ibose with high organizational involvement did not vote 
any more than nonorganizational members in both elections despite 
their possibly high system affect. 
'!bus, the case of liberal authoritarians clearly supports Hypo-
thesis 2, but that of conservative authoritarians does not. 
b. Civic Affect and Voting 
For all respondents with citizenship, civic affect is positively 
related to voting in the congressional election regardless of authori-
7 
tarianism. A similar relationship was found for the local election, 
except for liberal nonauthoritarians, among whom civic affect does not 
make any difference in voting (Table VI.3). 
Because civic affect already has a positive effect on voting in 
both elections, organizational involvement does not intervene in the 
relationship between civic affect and voting. Regardless of their 
involvement in organizations, those with high civic affect voted more 
both in national and local elections. And the effect of civic affect 
on voting seems not to be different between authoritarians and non-
authoritarians whether they are liberals or conservatives (Tables VI. 
3. and VI.4.). Since overall civic affect is so low, respondents 
with high civic affect seem to be those who have the urge to vote to 
fulfill their civic duty. 'Iberefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported in 
the case of civic affect. 
c. Input Affect and Voting 
Except among liberal nonauthoritarians, input affect is posi-
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tively related to voting in the congressional election. Authoritari-
ans with high input affect showed a higher voting rate in congressional 
election (for the liberals Gamma=.24; for the conservatives Gamma=.26). 
But in local election, the voting rate was lower than in congressional 
8 
election and the effect of input affect was not consistent for authori-
tarians. With liberal authoritarians, input affect was manifested in 
a higher voting rate (Gamma=.28) but not with conservative authorita-
rians (Gamma= -.04). 
Input affect is positively related to voting in congressional 
Table VI.4. Authoritarianism 1 Organizational Involvement 
Political Affect 1 and Voting (Gammas) 
Voting in Congressional Election 
Political Affect 
System Civic Input Output 
Ll..beral Authoritarians 
Org. Membership None -.10 .74 -.15 -.44 
One or Two .60 .07 .38 .10 
More than Two .11 .48 .21 .38 
Conservative Authoritarians 
Org. Membership None -.07 .33 -.23 .0 
One or Two .71 .32 .69 .23 
More than Two -.20 .11 .43 .o 
Voting in Local Election 
Liberal Authoritarians 
Org. Membership None .05 .48 .13 .03 
One or Two .36 .43 .25 .04 
More than Two .29 .66 .28 -.19 
Conservative Authoritarians 
Org. Membership None .47 .20 -.33 -.11 
One or More .76 .44 -.41 .60 
More than Two -.36 .22 .54 ..,.,12 
81 
election if respondents are involved in organizations, both for liberal 
and conservative authoritarians (Table VI.4). In the local election, 
that positive relationship was also found among liberal authoritarians 
but faltered a little bit among conservative authoritarians. However, 
the general direction is that even authoritarians, those who partici-
pate in organizations are more likely to vote with high input affect. 
Organizational involvement further enhances the relationship be-
tween input affect and voting in the congressional election for auth-
oritarians (both liberal and conservative), supporting Hypothesis 2. 
d. Output Affect and Voting 
High output affect itself alone is not positively related to 
participation in voting with the citizens in the current sample. 
Authoritarians voted more than nonauthoritarians in the congressional 
election, if they had high output affect, both for the liberals (Gamma 
9 
= -17) and the conservatives (Gamma= -.27). 
Organizational involvement intervenes in the effect of output 
affect on voting in congressional election for liberal authoritarians, 
clearly supporting Hypothesis 3. That relationship is weaker among 
conservative authoritarians. No such pattern is found in local elec-
tion (Table VI.4). 
3. Nonconventional Participation--Protest Activities 
Although it was not clearly stated in Hypothesis 2 about protest 
activities as unconventional political participation, they were a part 
of the agenda in the current study. As was mentioned in the introduc-
tion to this dissertation, Koreans have been exposed to a political 
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ethos in which protest activities are perceived as a routinized form 
of political participation because direct voting rights have been 
withheld on many occasions. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 can be rephrased 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 2.a. Among authoritarians, those who participate in 
voluntary organizations and have higher political efficacy are more 
likely to approve political protest than those who do not partici-
pate in voluntary organizations. 
In the current survey, four types of protest activities were 
proposed to respondents, who were asked whether they approved or dis-
approved of such activities. Responses to those items (Table VI.5) 
made up a composite Protest Index (see Appendix I.4.b). 
Table.VI.5. Res Eons es Protest Items (percentage) 
Disapprove Depends Approve 
Protest letters to politicians 2.3% 39.6% 58.1% 
Demonstration and Marching 15.1 52.8 32.1 
Disobeying Unjust Government 17.0 38.7 44.3 
Violent Protest 27.5 44.6 27.9 
The current data revealed that Koreans are highly prone to ap-
prove of protest activities compared to respondents to a five Western 
nations' sample (Barnes and Kasse, 1979. pp.69-82). Although the two 
10 
sets of measurements may not be exactly compatable, the Korean res-
pendents were more likely to approve protest letters and disobeying 
unjust government than any of the five Western nationals. Koreans are 
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more likely to approve of demonstrations and violent form of protest 
11 
than Americans, British, or Germans. 
On the Protest Index, higher protest potential was found among 
12 
younger males, better-educated, and nonprofessionals. Authoritari-
anism alone had little effect on protest approval but when the libe-
ral/conservative dimension of authoritarianism was controlled, libe-
rals were found more likely to approve of protests than conservatives 
(Gamma= -.16), as in the following patterns (Tables VI.6 and VI.7): 
i) Liberal nonauthoritarians were less prone to protest if 
they had high system, civic and output affects. 
ii) Liberal authoritarians were more prone to protest if they 
had high system and civic affects but low input and output affects. 
iii) Conservative nonauthoritarians were more prone to protest 
if they had high system, input and output affects. 
iv) Conservative authoritarians were more likely to approve 
protest if they had high civic and input affects. 
Liberal authoritarians were more likely to approve protests when 
they had high regard for the political system and when they were per-
forming civic duties with loyalty, but they did not see the govern-
Table VI.6 Protest AQQroval by Authoritarianism (Percentage) 
Protest Index 
Low Moderate High Row Total 
Liberals 
Nonauthoritarians 1.8 52.7 45.5 100 ( N = 55) 
Authoritarians 1.0 55.0 44.0 100 ( N = 102) 
Conservatives 
Nonauthoritarians 2.6 68.4 28.9 100 ( N = 40) 
Authoritarians 3.0 64.2 32.8 100 ( N = 68) 
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ment's fair treatment nor did they feel confident about their ability 
to influence the political process. 
Conservative authoritarians were more likely to approve protests 
when they performed their civic duties with loyalty and felt that they 
could influence the political processes; but they did not feel that 
the government and politicians were doing their part. Approval of 
protest activities was more likely to happen with the respondents who 
had higher system affect (Gamma=.11), civic affect (Gamma=.21) and in-
put affect (Gamma =.17), but not output affect (Gamma=.02) 
Those who participated in organizations were slightly more like-
ly to approve protests (Gamma=.13). The Protest Index shows that or-
ganizational participation does not, in a specific pattern, intervene 
in the effects of political efficacy on approving protest activities. 
Even among those who are not involved in organizations, all four poli-
tical efficacy items have positive effects on protest approval. 
Table VI.7 Protest AEEroval br Authoritarianism & Political Affect 
(Gammas) 
Political Affect 
System Civic Input Output 
Liberal 
Nonauthoritarians -.19 -.07 .16 -.07 
Authoritarians .36 .43 -.13 -.OS 
Conservatives 
Nonauthoritarian .32 .04 .19 .22 
Authoritarian .04 .17 .38 .03 
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B. Political Issue Preference 
The respondents of this survey, in general, are more interested 
in the political issues about their native homeland than the issues 
facing America; more about Korean politicians than American politici-
ans; and less about Korean-American power building in the U.S. than in 
influencing the politics in their homeland (Table VII.8). However, 
the naturalized citizens are more likely to have greater interest in 
American political issues, while the non-citizens are more likely to 
have greater interest in Korean political issue (Table VII.8). 
As to preference among liberal-conservative issues, interest in 
liberal issues prevails over conservative ones. The human rights pro-
blem was rated as more important than security assistance to Korea, 
while social welfare was rated as more important than defense in U.S. 
domestic spending (Table VI.9). However, in regard to minority poli-
tics in the U.S., they showed more conservative preferences. Placing 
ethnic (Korean) persons in public of fices is more important (56.0 %) 
than getting help through American politicians (35.0 %) as a goal in 
political participation (Table VI.10). 
As the main theme of this research is on the effects of authori-
tarianism on political efficacy and behavior, this section explores 
how authoritarianism and political efficacy are related to the prefer-
ence among political issues, with the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: In the choices among political issues, the auth-
oritarian and politically less-competent respondents exhibit signi-
ficantly different emphases than their less-authoritarian and more 
politically competent counterparts. The authoritarian/less-compet-
ent respondents are more likely to prefer basic needs-oriented and 
homeland-oriented political issues. 
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Table VI.8. Issue Preference in Political Discussions 
Issues degree of interest (%) 
Great Somewhat Almost none Missing 
U.S. Political Issues 35.3 47.8 13.4 
Korean-American Power 22.2 34.1 41.1 
U.S. Politicians 19.8 53.9 21.9 
Korean Political Issues 45.5 38.8 12.8 
Korean Politicians 31.2 43.1 23.6 
Influence Korean Politics 25.1 32.9 39.4 
Table VI.9. Political Issue Preferences by Citizenship 
(per cent of "great interest" expressed ) 
3.5 
2.6 
3.5 
2.7 
2.1 
3.6 
Issues Citizens Noncitizens Row Total 
U.S. Political Issues 46.9 23.3 
Korean-American Power 24.9 18.7 
American Politicians 27.9 12.8 
Korean Political Issues 42.3 46.7 
Korean Politicians 26.6 36.8 
Influence Korean Politics 22.7 26.7 
Table.VI.IO. Government Policy Preference (in Per cent) 
U.S. Policy on Korea 
Aids and Security 
Human Rights 
No Answer 
Sub Total 
U.S. Domestic Policy 
Social Welfare 
Defense 
No Answer 
Sub Total 
Goals of Minority Participation in Politics 
Positions (Placement of Koreans) 
Help through American Politicians 
No Answer 
Sub Total 
42.0 
50.1 
8.9 
101.0 
67.3 
23.0 
9.7 
101.0 
56.0 
35.0 
9.0 
100.0 
N = 113 
69 
65 
137 
97 
76 
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1. Authoritarianism and American Political Issues 
Three American political issue items were added to make up the 
American Political Issue Index, and similarly for the Korean Political 
Issue Index (see Appendix I.5.a). There is not much difference in 
interest in American vs. Korean politics between the authoritarians 
13 
and the nonauthoritarians. Educational attainment is positively rel-
ated to interests in both Korean and American political issues and 
females tend to have lower interest in both issues. Occupational and 
income status is not related to political issue preference. But most 
other key variables such as organizational involvement and years of 
residence in this country are positively related to interest in the 
American political issues but negatively to the Korean issues (Figure 
14 
VI.1.). As years of residence in this country increase, interest in 
American politicians also increases (Gamma=.19), while interest in 
Figure. VI.1. Major Variables and Political Issue Preferences (Gammas) 
Korean Issues vs. American Issues 
Negative <----- -.12 Sex -.22 -----> Negative 
Positive <----- .13 Education .26 ------> Positive 
Negative <----- -.27 Years Lived .22 ------> Positive 
" <---- -.11 U.S. Citizen .40 ------> " 
" <---- -.12 Organization .27 -----> " 
II <--- -.22 English Use .29 ------> " 
" <---- -.01 Authoritarian .09 ----> " 
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Korean politicians decreases (Gamma= -.20) as does influencing Korean 
politics (Gamma= -.18). Language proficiency is related to political 
efficacy. Those less fluent in English are less interested in U.S. 
politics (Gamma=.29) and in American politicians (Gamma=.15), but are 
15 
more interested in Korean politicians (Gamma= -.22). 
a. System Affect and Interest in Political Issues 
System affect shows a positive relationship with American pol-
itical issue preferences both among the authoritarians and nonauthori-
tarians in the following patterns. Patterns (i) and (ii) support 
Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.11): 
Table.VI.11. Authoritarianism, Political Affect, and Issue Preference 
(Gammas) 
American Political Issues 
Political Affect 
System Civic Input Output 
Liberal 
Nonauthoritarians .22 .60 .20 -.15 
Authoritarians .14 .22 .11 .05 
Conservative 
Nonauthoritarians .12 .31 .33 .10 
Authoritarians .24 .32 .16 .04 
Korean Political issues 
Liberal 
Nonauthoritarians .19 -.07 -.48 .06 
Authoritarians .08 .11 -.28 -.05 
Conservative 
Nonauthoritarians -.38 -.21 .02 -.16 
Authoritarians -.08 -.29 -.04 -.05 
i) Authoritarians, both liberals (Gamma=.14) and conserva-
tives (Gamma =.24) are likely to have a high interest in American 
political issues if they have a high system affect. 
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ii) Even the conservative authoritarians and also conserva-
tive nonauthoritarians are less likely to prefer Korean political 
issues if they have a high system affect. 
iii) Liberal nonauthoritarians with a high system affect are 
slightly more likely to have interest in Korean politics than 
those who have a low system affect. 
b. Civic Affect and Interest in Political Issues 
Civic affect is strongly related to interest in American poli-
tical issues among authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. Both of the 
following patterns support Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.11): 
i) Authoritarians both on liberal (Gamma=.22) and conserva-
tive (Gamma =. 32) sides are more likely to have high interest in 
American political issues if they have a high civic affect. 
ii) Except for liberal nonauthoritarians, those with lower 
civic affect are more likely to have interest in Korean politics. 
Especially, conservative authoritarians are more likely to prefer 
Korean issues if their civic affect is low (Gamma= -.29). 
c. Input Affect and Interest in Political Issues 
Most respondents with high input affect expressed more interest 
in American and less in interest Korean political issues as hypothe-
sized. In other words, if their input affect is low, both liberal and 
conservative authoritarians are not likely to have much interest in 
16 
American political issues, in the following patterns (Table VI.11): 
i) For most of the respondents, input affect is negatively 
related to interest in Korean political issues, except among con-
servative nonauthoritarians. 
ii) Authoritarians with low input affect, both liberal (Gamma 
= -.28) and conservative (Gamma= -.04) are more likely to have 
higher interest in Korean politics than their counterparts with 
high input affect. 
The above patterns show that, in the case of input affect, Korean 
vs. American issue preferences clearly coincide with the hypothesized 
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direction. 
d. Output Affect and Interest in Political Issues 
With output affect, the hypothesized relationship appears among 
most of the respondents, although the strength of relationships is 
very weak (Table VI.11): 
i) Except for the liberal nonauthoritarians, most respond-
ents with high output affect are more likely to prefer American 
political issues; but those with low output affect are more likely 
to prefer Korean political issues. 
ii) Liberal nonauthoritarians with high output affect have 
less interest in American political issues (Gamma= -.15), but 
more interest in Korean political issues (Gamma=.06). 
Thus, in the case of output affect, Hypothesis 3. is supported 
among the respondents excluding liberal nonauthoritarians. 
2. Authoritarianism and Liberal/Conservative Issue Preferences 
There is another point of concern whether authoritarianism and 
political efficacy have any effect on preference for liberal vs. con-
servative political issues. The responses to the six policy items 
shown in Table VI.9 made up the Political Issue Index (Table VI.12) 
so that on a continuum of the index, the lower values represent libe-
ral issue preference and the higher values represent conservative cho-
ices (Appendix I.S.b). 
The utility of the Liberal/Conservative Issue index is limited 
because some of the items do not precisely measure the traditional 
liberal vs. conservative issue preferences as far as the Korean immi-
grants are concerned. Particularly, social welfare spending by the 
U.S. government cannot be considered as a liberal issue but rather 
should be considered as a conservative issue, because many Korean 
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immigrants are linked to this as beneficiaries. It does not mean that 
a high proportion of Korean immigrants are direct welfare recipients 
but rather that a good proportion of medical doctors and small-busi-
ness owners depend on clients whose disposable income is primarily 
derived from the social welfare budget. 
When welfare spending is counted as one of conservative issues, 
the Issue Index shows sensible relationships with other variables. 
Therefore, in the c~rrent analysis, the concept of conservative issues 
should be considered rather as self-preserving ones, while liberal 
17 
issues as altruistic ones. 
Table VI.12 .Authoritarianism and Liberal-Conservative Issues ( % ) 
Issue Index 
Liberal 1 2 3 4 Conservative 
Liberal 
Nonauthoritarian 20.8 39.6 37.7 1.9 (N = 53) 
Authoritarian 16.0 45.3 29.2 9.4 (N = 106) 
Conservative 
Nonauthoritarian 20.5 33.3 41.0 5.1 (N = 39) 
Authoritarian 15.9 36.2 37.7 10.1 (N = 69) 
Missing cases=77 / Gamma=.09 
There is a trend that authoritarians, overall, are slightly more 
likely to prefer conservative issues (mean issue score 2.35 vs. 2.24) 
but the differences between the two groups are minimal (Gamma=.08). 
When liberal/conservative dimensions of authoritarianism is controlled, 
the following patterns appear: 
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i) Authoritarians have higher mean issue scores than non-
authoritarians among the liberals (2.31 vs. 2.19) and also among 
the conservatives (2.43 vs. 2.32). 
ii) The conservatives have a little higher issue score than 
the liberals (2.39 vs. 2.27). 
Although the differences in mean issue scores are small, the 
above patterns support the hypothesized relationship. And a small but 
consistent pattern can also be found in the frequency distribution 
(Table VI.12). The effect of organizational involvement on conser-
vative/liberal issue preference is very weak (Gamma= -.03), although 
the sign indicates that organizational members are more likely to pre-
fer liberal issues. 
a. System Affect and Issue Index 
Respondents with high system affect are more likely to prefer 
conservative issues regardless of whether they are authoritarians or 
not. Thus the following patterns are opposite to the predicted rela-
tionship and Hypothesis 3 is not supported (Table VI.13): 
i) Among the liberals, the strength of relationship between 
system affect and Issue Index is slightly stronger for nonauthori-
tarians (Gamma=.34) than authoritarians (Gamma=.19). 
ii) Among the conservatives, nonauthoritarians (GaIIlllla=.16) 
are not much different from authoritarians (GaIIlllla=.17) in the 
relationship between system affect and Issue Index. 
b. Civic Affect and Issue Index 
There are some mixed responses with civic affect. The following 
pattern i) contradict Hypothesis 3, while ii) weakly support Hypo-
thesis 3 (see Table VI.13): 
i) High civic affect is related to the preference for con-
servative issues among conservative authoritarians (Gamma=.12). 
Same trend was found among liberal nonauthoritarians(Gamma=.20). 
ii) Among conservative nonauthoritarians, low civic affect 
is related to preference for conservative issues (Gamma= -.06). 
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A similar trend was found for liberal authoritarians (Gamma=-.11). 
c. Input Affect 
Clearer patterns were found with input affect for most of the 
respondents, supporting Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13): 
i) All authoritarian respondents with low input affect showed 
more preference for conservative issues (Gamma= -.22 for liberals 
and -.19 for conservatives). 
ii) The above trend was also found with conservative nonauth-
oritarians (Gamma= -.16), but not with the liberal nonauthoritari-
ans (Gamma=.04). 
d. Output Affect 
Only nonauthoritarians with low output affect responded in the 
direction of Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13): 
i) Liberal nonauthoritarians are more likely to choose lib-
eral issues if their output affect is high than liberal authori-
tarians (Gamma= -.18) if their output affect is high. 
ii) Among the conservatives, nonauthoritarians are, again, 
more likely to choose liberal issues (Gamma= -.34) if their out-
put affect is high, than are authoritarians (Gamma= -.34). 
Table .VI.13. Political Affect, and Liberal/Conservative 
Political Issue Index 
Political Affect (Gammas) 
System Civic Input 
Liberal 
Nonauthoritarian .33 .20 .04 
Authoritarian .19 -.11 -.22 
Conservative 
Nonauthoritarian .16 -.04 -.16 
Authoritarian .17 .12 -.19 
Output 
-.18 
.02 
-.34 
.01 
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In the above patterns, both liberal and conservative authori-
tarians are not likely to show their responses in the hypothesized 
direction. So Hypothesis 3 has no been supported in the case of out-
put affect. 
Summary 
Although Korean-Americans are one of the new immigrant groups, 
the rate of their naturalization to U.S. citizenship and voter regis-
tration is higher than for Hispanics. Voting rate is positively rel-
ated to educational attainment and years of residence in this country. 
Organizational involvement increases political efficacy and political 
participation (protest activities as well as voting). These findings 
indicate that the Korean-Americans' future in political participation 
will be very active. 
Authoritarians, both liberal and conservative, would be most 
protest-prone if they had high civic affect. In other words, authori-
tarians who perform their civic duty with a great sense of satisfaction 
are also most likely to protest against improper governmental perform-
ance. The profiles of protest-prone authoritarian subjects can be sum-
marized as shown in Figure VI.I. 
Hypothesis 2 was fully supported by input affect, partially by 
system affect(for liberals) and output affect (for conservatives) but 
not by civic affect. 
In the choices of political issues, the respondents generally 
expressed more concerns with their homeland politics than American 
politics. However, the naturalized citizens definitely showed· more 
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Figure VI.2. Profiles of the Protest Prone Authoritarians 
Ll.berals 
High System Affect 
------>> Highly Protest Prone 
High Civic Affect 
--------->> " 
Low Input Affect 
------>> " 
Low Output Affect 
-------->> " 
Conservative 
High Civic Affect 
------->> Highly Protest Prone 
High Input Affect 
-------->> " 
interest in politics in America than in homeland and the years of 
sojourn in this country are positively related to this trend, indi-
cating that a slow political assimilation is taking place among this 
immigrant group. Organizational involvement and competence in English 
usage seem to be two other major variables in their political assimi-
lation; they are positively related to the preference for American 
political issues but negatively to Korean political issues. 
Besides these variables, authoritarianism alone has not much 
effect on the choices among political issues either in their home-
land or in the U.S. But if the conservative/liberal dimension is 
added, some recognizable patterns appear. Generally, authoritarians 
with high political efficacy seem to be more politically assimilated. 
But the liberal nonauthoritarians who have high expectations in regard 
to the government (high system and output affect) and low subjective 
efficacy (low civic and input affect), tend to show more interest in 
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Korean political issues. 
In regard to preference for liberal vs. conservative political 
issues, authoritarians showed more preference for conservative issues 
than nonauthoritarians as hypothesized. High system affect is related 
to preferring conservative issues regardless of authoritarianism. All 
authoritarians with low input affect preferred more conservative issues, 
while nonauthoritarians with high output affect preferred more liberal 
issues. These patterns generally support Hypothesis 3. But no clear 
pattern can be established with civic affect. 
NOTES 
1. Citizenship acquisition among immigrants from selected count-
ries and regions: 1971-1980 totals and percentage of total immigrants. 
Cuba 
178,374 
12% 
Mexico 
68,152 
5% 
S. America 
40,843 
3% 
Canada W. Europe 
130,380 371,683 
9% 25% 
Asia 
473,754 
32% 
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, 1980. 
2. The Political Participation Index is significantly related 
to the years of residence in the U.S. (Gamma=.58), to U.S. citizenship 
(Gamma=.80), to educational attainment (Gamma=.35), and also to organi-
zational membership (Gamma=.31). 
3. The voting rates in the 1980 U.S. presidential election by 
race are 58% for Whites, 45% for Blacks, and 38% for Hispanics (Abram-
son et al., 1982. p.80), although the voting rates in the off-year con-
gressional elections have been about 5% lower than in the presiden-
tial elections through the 60s and 70s (Presidential Commission for 
National Agenda for the Eighties, 1981). 
Hispanic voter registration rates among eligible voters were 
53.6% in 1980 and 51% in 1982 (Pachon, 1985. p.247). 
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4. The relationship between authoritarianism and voting is very 
weak (Gamma=.01 for congressional and .08 for local elections). 
Voting in the congressional election is positively related to educa-
tional attainment (Gamma=.57) and years of residence in the U.S. 
(Gamma=.40), weakly to income (Gamma=.11). Apparently white-collar 
job holders are more active in voting than blue-collar workers and 
others (Gamma= -.33). While 75% of professionals, 63.2% of tech-
nical workers, 57.1% of clerical workers, and 48.5% of managerials 
voted in the congressional election, the voting rate of unskilled 
factory workers was 38.6%. Females tended to be less active voters 
(Gamma= -.42). About one-third (35.0%) of female citizens and 57.4 
% of males voted in the 1982 congressional election. 
5. The females' voting rate is lower than males' (42.6 % vs. 
28.3 % ;Gamma= -.29). Educational attainment is also positively rel-
ated to voting in the local election (Gamma=.44); blue-collar workers 
voted less than white-collars (Gamma= -.21). Income had almost no rel-
ationship to voting (Gamma= -.04); years of residence in this country 
had a positive relationship (Gamma=.14). 
6. In the congressional election, one half of the high system 
affect group (50.5%) and 38 per cent of the moderate system affect 
group voted while only one member of the low system affect group 
voted. In the local election, 45.7% of the high system affect 
group and 29.1% of moderate system affect group of the citizens 
voted, while only one person of the low system affect group voted. 
7. The voting rate in the congressional election is higher with 
the high civic affect group (69%) than with the moderate civic affect 
group (47.6%), while only on person among the low civic group voted. 
But the voting rates in the local election are not much different 
between the high civic affect group (52.4%) and the moderate civic 
affect group (54.8%). 
8. In the congressional election, 61.7% of the high input 
affect group and 48.7% of the moderate input affect group voted, 
while 45.8% of the low input affect group did. In the local election, 
voting rates were lower and the group differences are small; 47.8% of 
the high input affect group and 36% of the moderate input affect group 
voted, while 37.5% of the low input affect group did. 
9. In the congressional election the voting rates of the high 
output affect group (54.4%) and those of the moderate output affect 
group (55%) were not much different, while the low output affect group 
had a slightly lower voting rate (44.4%). In the local election, those 
with higher output affect had higher voting rate (52.9%) than those 
with moderate (46.2%) and low (32.6%) output affect. 
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10. The current study used protest approval measurement only, 
while the five nations studies used protest approval and protest in-
tention measures. However, the intercorrelations between the protest 
approval and intention ("might do protest") measures were very high 
(average r=.53, lowest r=.45 among Austrians and highest r =67. among 
Americans). 
11. Marsh and Kasse (1979) analyzed the data collected in 1974 
by a joint project, initially from five nations (Germany, the U.S., 
Britain, the Netherlands, and Austria). The approval rates of protest 
activities by the Koreans can be compared with the highest approval 
rates among the Western national samples as follows: 
* Petitions - Koreans' (58.1%) approval rate is twice higher 
than of the British (23%). 
*Boycotts - most approved by the Americans (26%), but 44.3 % 
of the Korean respondents approved disobeying the unjust gov-
ernment. 
*Demonstrations - 33% by the Austrians vs. 32.1% by the Koreans; 
both much higher than by the Americans (21%). 
* Violent form of protests - the Koreans followed very closely 
(27.9%) the Dutch (31%); Americans showed less approval (20%). 
12. Females had lower protest potential than did males (Gamma 
= -.29), while better-educated respondents were more likely to approve 
protest activities (Gamma=.25). Although occupational status does not 
have a linear relationship with the Protest Index, professionals were 
less likely to approve protest activities than were blue-collar workers. 
Also age did not have a linear relationship with the Protest Index, but 
those in their 20's were more protest prone than any other age grouping: 
approval of protest activities by age; 20's 50%, 30's 34.8 %, 40's 
39 %, 50's and older 40 %. Length of residence in the U.S. had little 
relationship with protest potential (Gamma=.01), but U.S. citizenship 
had some effect on this (Gamma=.13). 
13. Authoritarians are slightly more interested in Korean poli-
tics than nonauthoritarians; 40.6 % of nonauthoritarians and 44.6 % 
of the authoritarians have great interest in Korean politics. 
14. More than than half (55.2 %) of those who have lived less 
than five years in this country have great interest in Korean poli-
tics, while that proportion is 43.3 % for the 5 -10 years group and 
26.6 % for those who lived over ten years in this country. The U.S. 
citizens are less interested in Korean politics than resident aliens 
(Gamma= -.21). 
15. Only one-third of the respondents can communicate well in 
English (12.5 % speak fluently and 23.0% well). 
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16. All respondents who have high input affect are more likely 
to have high interest in American political issues, even authoritari-
ans both liberal (Gamma=.11) and conservative (Gamma=.16). 
17. Women are more likely to prefer conservative issues (Gamma=.25) 
and better-educated respondents are less likely to choose conservative 
issues (Gamma= -.21). The Liberal-Conservative Issue Index is nega-
tively related to years of residence in this country (Gamma= -.11) and 
citizenship (Gamma= -.OS). Those who have lived here longer are more 
likely to choose liberal issues. 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
A. General Findings About Authoritarianism and 
Its Political Implications 
The Korean respondents expressed higher authoritarianism than 
Americans in traits of aggression, submissiveness, and anti-egalita-
rianism. However, the Koreans' preferences for egalitarianism and 
openness to new ideas were much higher than expected. It is interes-
ting to find that authoritarian submissiveness and aggression are 
correlated positively with egalitarianism and openness to new ideas. 
Although some of the relationships were statistically insignifi-
cant, major findings confirmed the direction of relationships between 
authoritarianism (either liberal or conservative) and political affect. 
The findings indicate that the liberal authoritarians are the predomi-
nant population in Korean political activism (34 per cent) rather than 
the conservative authoritarians (22 per cent), whom the original writ-
ers were concerned about (Adorno, et al., 1950), or than non authori-
tarians. 
One of the writer's goals in this research was to determine a 
causal sequence between organizational involvement and political com-
petence. At the beginning of this research, there was a question 
whether the effect of personal competence as the result of childhood 
socialization precedes one's organizational involvement, or whether 
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organizational involvement in a later stage in life has the greater 
effect on political efficacy. The writer has been unable to resolve 
this question with the current data, because regression analyses for 
the path model failed to present any significant equations. 
Authoritarianism is associated with social class variables in 
the current data and social class variables have stronger explanatory 
power than authoritarianism does in the relationship with political 
efficacy and participation variables. 
These findings and the unresolved questions with authoritarian-
ism and political efficacy lead to the question of other covariates, 
such as social class variables and the political culture unique to 
Koreans. 
There is also a conceptual problem than a problem of method 
or data. The writer's assumption has followed predominantly Freudian 
explanation of the genesis of authoritarianism, emphasizing the res-
ults of early childhood socialization. But the authoritarian charac-
ters attributed to psychological traits also reflect cultural values. 
In Marxian explanation, authoritarianism is the internalized cultural 
values and the harnessed human energy being molded to meet the social 
structure and role requirements (Greenstein, 1965, p.267). These 
arguments are not resolved and the current writer had no intetion to 
tangle with this conceptual problem with his limited data. 
Christie and Cook, citing that highly educated individuals pre-
fer general liberality of social outlook, argued that "F-scale is a 
measure of social sophistication to a much greater extent than origin-
ally intended" by the authors of the "authoritarian personality." And 
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F-scale is most meaningful when employed in middle-class sample but 
uncertain with working class sample (1958, p.176). They argued that 
"In broad terms authoritarian syndrome reflects adherence to values 
which run counter to those accepted by liberal and literate citizens 
of the U.S." (1958, p.188). 
But the writer does not concede that the utility of F-scale is 
limited to measuring American cultural values. If a modified F-scale 
have failed to measure the psychological traits of the Korean respond-
ents, then, it is possible that certain cultural factors have preven-
ted psychological traits from detection. And there should be a search 
for alternatives. 
Considering that social psychological variables (ie., political 
efficacy) were found to have no significant relationship in a massive 
1 
sample in Korea (Kim, et al., 1980), current findings may mean much 
more than what they seem to. As Kim et al. (1980) have speculated in 
regard to their Korean sample, the results which even contradicted 
their hypothesis might indicate that their respondents have not given 
truthful answers in fear of retaliation by the government against such 
opinions which are not in accordance with the goals of the government. 
Political organizations in Korea depend upon government for approval 
and protection even for their continued existence. Many such organi-
zations are organized by the government itself and others are under 
its formal or informal auspices, except for a few autonomous groups 
such as student and Christian clubs acting in defiance of government 
controls. This remnant of homeland political culture may be still 
functioning in the immigrant communities in the U.S. 
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B. A Political Culture in Transition 
The dominant features in Korean political culture can be sum-
marized in three categories as described in the Introduction to this 
research. 
I.Politics of Hierarchy and Deference 
In Korean politics, those in leadership positions used to per-
ceive their roles to be active commanding ones, and those on the re-
ceiving end were used to accepting their roles as blind submissive 
ones. Such attitudes and values have their roots in the traditional 
religions (Shamanism, then Buddhism and Confucianism) which legitimi-
zed the totalitarian practices by the sovereign ruler. Even Christi-
anity has been melted into the perspectives of vertical human rela-
tionships, and except for a few liberal Christian leaders the majority 
of Protestant affiliates have been aligned with the established power 
since President Syng Man Rhee (1948-1960) and the military ruler Chung 
Hee Park (1961-1979). 
Even the major newspapers are describing President Doo Whan Chun, 
who took power by military coup d'etat in 1980, as Tong-chi-kwon-ja 
(sovereign leader, the one who has the right to rule), and challenges 
to his legitimacy have not been tolerated. 
Under these circumstances, political actors cannot play the role 
of allegiant participants because their political affects are cons-
tantly threatened and cannot be freely exercised in action. The maj-
ority's choice could be either submission, revolt, or self-alienation 
(with apathy). 
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The political culture in such a nation could not be dominated 
by the allegiant participants who present the best profile of a stable 
democracy. The political culture of a given nation is comprised of a 
number of subcultures. From a typology of political cultures (Almond 
and Verba, 1963, pp. 12-42), modified types of political actors can be 
derived and the respondents of the current sample can fit in as shown 
in Figure VII.l. 
Figure VII.l.TrEeS of Political Culture and Political Actors 
(in Per cents, from Current Data) 
Political Affects 
System Civic Input Output N ( % ) 
Allegiant Participant high high high high 10 ( 3.5) 
Allegiant Subject high low low high 151 (52.8) 
Alienated low high low low 94 (22.9) 
Parochial Subject low low low low 31 (10.8) 
It is often argued that the political climate of Korea pushed 
many Western-oriented intellectuals to emigrate to America. It is true 
that the Korean immigrants who came to the U.S. during the first decade 
after implementation of the 1965 Immigration Law are highly represented 
in the productive age group (29-39 years old) and among professionals 
(Choy, 1979, pp. 242-43 and Hyung C. Kim, 1977, p.115). 
In the current data, only 3.5 per cent of the valid cases are 
allegiant participants who make up an ideal subculture for a stable 
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democracy. Half (52.8 per cent) of the respondents are allegiant-
subjects in the presence of strong leadership or system; 32.9 per 
cent are alienated; and 10.8 per cent are parochial subjects. 
These findings indicate that the Korean immigrants' political 
orientation might not have changed much from what they used to be 
before their emigration, or from what the homeland Koreans are cur-
rently holding. With such political orientations the Korean immi-
grants seem to fall into the mixed category of the "subject-partici-
pant culture" of Almond and Verba (op.cit., pp.25f.): 
In the mixed subject-participant culture a substantial part of 
the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an 
activist set of self-orientations, while most of the remainder 
of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian 
governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-
orientations ••• In the Western European examples of this type of 
political culture - France, Germany, and Italy in the nineteenth 
and present centuries - there was a characteristic pattern of 
structural instability with an alternation of authoritarian and 
democratic governments. 
Our findings on authoritarianism, organizational involvement, 
and political efficacy (Chapter V) indicate that the respondents in 
the current study poses political subcultures according to the fol-
lowing patterns: 
i) Conservatives are more parochial, more submissive, and 
less alienated than liberals, making them a bit backward in poli-
tical orientation. 
ii) Liberal nonauthoritarians have the lowest proportions of 
allegiant subjects or parochial subjects. They are more likely 
to be allegiant participants with high proportion of alienated 
individuals. 
iii) There are no allegiant participants among liberal 
ritarians, who are more likely to be allegiant subjects. 
compared to liberal nonauthoritarians, they have the same 
tion of alienated and parochial respondents. 
autho-
When 
propor-
106 
iv) Conservative nonauthoritarians have the highest propor-
tion of allegiant subjects and the lowest proportion of alienated 
subjects. 
v) Conservative authoritarians are less likely to be sub-
missive to government authorities but are more alienated than 
conservative nonauthoritarians. 
Liberal nonauthoritarians seem to be the most democratic group, 
while liberal authoritarians seem to be the most threatening to stable 
democracy. Conservative nonauthoritarians seem to be the group most 
compliant with nondemocratic and mobilized political culture, while 
their authoritarian counterparts could be more resistive. 
Females are slightly more oriented as allegiant subjects but are 
less parochial than males. Age, educational attainment, and organi-
zational involvement have no linear relationship with this typology 
of political orientation. White-collar workers seem to have the most 
stable political orientation among the respondents. Blue-collar work-
ers are most likely to be allegiant subjects (60 per cent) and the 
least alienated, but the most parochial, making them the most backward 
group among the respondents. 
Table VII.I Authoritarianism and Ti2es of Political Orientation 
Types of Political Orientation 
Alg-Part. Alg-Sub. Alien. Par-Sub. Row Total 
Liberal 
Nonauthoritarian 9.4 45.3 37.7 7.5 99.9 
Authoritarian 0 54.8 37.5 7.7 100.0 
Conservative 
Nonauthoritarian 2.9 60.0 22.9 14.3 100.1 
Authoritarian 5.6 50.0 30.6 13.9 100.1 
Alg-Part: Allegiant Participant 
Alien: Alienated Subject 
Alg-Sub: Subject 
Par-Sub: Parochial Subject.-
( 53) 
(104) 
( 35) 
( 72) 
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2. The Politics of Voter Mobilization 
Between the two distinct models of adult political socializa-
tion, the Korean scene fits the mobilization one. In the mobilization 
model, organizational activities and voting do not grow out of citi-
zens' psychological involvement but the citizens act either in compli-
ance with the pressures from government or in deference to community 
leaders. The citizenship model, on the other hand, is firmly rooted 
in citizens' awareness of political affairs, psychological involvement, 
and their social positions (Figure VII.2 and 3). 
Korea is one of the nations which have the highest voting rate 
in the world. Kim et al. (1980) found that, while the average voting 
rate among 2,276 Korean respondents was 87 per cent, involvement in 
any political organization was barely more than 4 per cent. They found 
that voting participation in Korea did not stem from individual citizen 
political awareness, nor from any psychological involvement in politics. 
Even the direct effect of holding social positions was irrelevant (1980, 
p. 49). Their evidence supported the notion of mobilized voting, many 
citizens participating in voting merely in deference to government 
pressure or to the wishes of community notables (Yooji). 
With these two models, Kim et al. found that massive voting is 
taking place predominantly among those in social positions susceptible 
to mobilization, i.e. females, the old, the less educated, and rural 
residents (Figure VII.2). 
They argued that a transition from the mobilization model to the 
democratic citizenship model is essential for a stable democracy, but 
in reality they found that orily a partial transition has taken·place 
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(Figure VII. 3) • 
The current sample from the immigrant community in the U.S. in-
dicates that such a transition has progressed further here than in 
Korea. Better-educated respondents, males, and white-collar job-hold-
ers are more likely to participate in voting and in other political 
activities. Also, the voting rate is highest among those aged in their 
40s, followed by those in their 30s. People older or younger than 
these two groupings have a lower voting rate. Because Korean immi-
grants primarily reside in urban areas, a rural vs. urban comparison 
is not relevant. Instead, years of residence in the U.S. make a great 
difference in various attitudes and behaviors. Specifically the vot-
Figure VII.2. Mobilized Voting Model 
Social Position 
sex: female 
age: old 
residence: rural 
education: low 
Psychological Involvement Modes of Participation 
low psychological involve-
ment/high vulnerability 
to mobilization 
voting, 
organizational 
activities 
Figure VII.3. Democratic Citizenship Model 
Social Position 
sex: male 
age: young 
residence: urban 
education: high 
Psychological Involvement 
high political interest, 
high efficacy, high pro-
pensity to absorb 
information 
Modes of Participation 
active in political 
discussion, campaigns, 
contact with officials 
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ing rate of naturalized citizens is higher among those who have lived 
longer than 10 years in the U.S. than among the new citizens. 
Therefore, the transitional citizenship model for Korean immi-
grants is characterized by high political activity (including voting) 
among males, the middle-aged, the better-educated, and those who have 
lived longer in the U.S. (Figure VII.4). 
The Korean immigrants are undergoing a transition in their poli-
tical culture through their participation in voluntary organizations 
(as presented in Chapter VI), with the time factor (years of residence 
in the U.S.) playing a key role. 
Figure VII.4. Transitional Citizenship Model 
Social Position 
sex: male 
age: middle-ages 
education: high 
longer in U.S. 
Psychological Involvement 
high political interest 
high sense of efficacy 
high propensity to absorb 
information 
Modes of Participation 
active in 
political affairs 
voting 
3. Elite-Mass Gap and Potential for Rebellion 
The current data revealed that more Koreans approve of political 
protest activities (Table VII.5) than do respondents in five Western 
nations (Barnes and Kasse, 1979. p. 80). Protest approval has an ex-
tremely high correlation with individuals' actual participation or in-
tention toward such protest activities ("r" ranges between .72 to .92, 
in the five Western nations sample). Although the current data have 
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no proper measure to relate protest approval to intended or actual 
protest, the political reality in Korea supports the high protest pot-
ential in the current data as very meaningful. 
In the Korean political reality, protest activities are viewed 
with ambivalence. The students' protest in 1960 was instrumental in 
toppling dictator Syng Man Rhee's First Republic. Since then, stud-
ents' protest activities have been highly valued among the liberals 
in the context of the historical struggle for the independence of the 
nation and resistance against foreign invasion (cf. Political Culture 
in Chapter I.). 
However, conservative Koreans view the students' endless protests 
as a disruptive element in the nation's political and economic progress, 
undermining the legitimacy of the government and the existing political 
and economic system. 
Koreans on both sides seem to view protest activities as a part 
of transitional phenomena. The liberals seem to assume that once the 
dictatorship is removed, there will be no more need for protest acti-
vities; while the conservatives are determined not to listen to the 
protesters, believing that repression can silence protesters. Both 
groups seem to expect an end to this struggle on their own terms. 
Although the writer started with a main assumption that a psy-
chological variable (authoritarian sensitivity to relative deprivation 
or to structural discrepancies) could explain protest potential, he 
finds more variables involved. 
A number of theoretical factors of political protest seem to be 
applicable in explaining the case of Korean protesters: (i) political 
111 
and economic structures and conditions, (ii) perceived relative depri-
vation, (iii) expected success of rebellion despite the cost of conf-
lict, and (iv) situations in which the dissident group has a certain 
control over power sources (E. Muller, 1979. Chapter II). All these 
seem to be working together in Korea. 
The current data indicate that the liberal authoritarians will 
be more prone to protest if their high system and civic affect are 
matched with low input and output affect; and the conservatives are 
more likely to do so if their high civic and input affects are matched. 
The liberals' protest potential seems to be occurring in Korea as pro-
jected from the current data. 
The Korean respondents in the current sample expressed more pro-
test potential than did those in a purely American sample (Barnes and 
Kasse, 1979), although there was almost a decade's time gap between 
the two samples. 
For Koreans in the U.S., three of the above explanatory factors 
seem applicable. They are faced with structural discrimination; have 
a strong perception of relative deprivation; and they have reached 
a position where they can expect success in protest despite the cost 
2 
of conflict. The only explanatory factor that may not be applicable 
to the Korean-Americans' protest potential is that of group control 
over power resources. No one can predict how fast they can reach 
such a position, but they are currently striving for such access. 
As Barnes and Kasse argued (1979, p. 523f.), protest activities 
are not merely a challenge to the fading legitimacy of the government, 
nor are they just a fad of youth revolting from Oedipal urges. Protest 
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is also a form of routine political activity by the populace and will 
remain a stable part of democratic political processes. It will affect 
elite positions, changing them to become less hierarchical and less 
encompassing, increasing the extent of plural structure. 
C. Adaptation and Political Integration 
Although years of residence in the U.S. has a strong positive 
association with political activities and issue preferences, that 
relationship is not a linear one. There are turning and regress po-
ints in the process of transition in political orientation and parti-
cipation among the respondents in the current data. Interestingly, 
this pattern of conversion in political orientation seems to parallel 
the critical stages in the respondents' cognitive inconsistency about 
life in America. The findings support the argument that the time vari-
able is not a causal factor~~, but rather a pervasive indicator 
of the immigrants' acculturation, social assimilation and economic im-
provement. The data also support the argument that the adaptation-
3 
related factors vary in curvilinear fashion (Hurh and Kim, 1984). 
1. Transition in Civic Identity 
On the assumption of curvilinear relationship between the time 
factor and adaptation variables, Hurh and Kim proposed a hypothetical 
model of stages in the adaptation of Korean immigrants. In their pro-
cedural model of adaptation (Figure VII.5), Korean immigrants would 
4 
go through the following processes (1978, pp.96-100): 
i) Initial excitement and exigency of immigration; conditions 
of culture shock, underemployment, language barrier, social isola-
tion, etc. (1 to 3 years). 
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ii) Resolution: exigent conditions are redressed through their 
familiarity with American culture, employment, improvement in 
English, and relatively stable income. Taste for material afflu-
ence, interaction with Americans, and desire for Angloconformity 
may have increased. Thus, a degree of cultural assimilation may 
progress as time goes on ( 3 to 8 years). 
iii) Optimum point: past aspirations "in the land of opportu-
nity" may be revitalized, hence, life satisfaction and desire for 
assimilation may reach its peak (10 years). 
iv) Relative deprivation: comparison of their life chances to 
those of white Americans brings the Korean immigrants to face the 
racial barriers in social mobility and lead to a sense of personal 
inadequacy as well as institutional inadequacies (13 years). 
v) Identification crisis/social marginality: the sense of 
marginality follows the above stage. The question of "who am I" 
is raised as an intense problem (15 years). 
iv) Marginality acceptance or new identity: they may passively 
accept their marginal identity as "Koreans in America" and remain 
dysfunctional or create a new ethnic identity as the "Korean-Ameri-
cans" by a positive coping strategy (20 years). 
Figure VII.5 CRITICAL PHASES IN ADAPTATION PROCESS 
Degree of Adaptation 
(life satisfaction) 
Resolution 
Perceived Status 
Inconsistency 
~M'l' argina ity 
Identification Acceptance 
Crisis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 years 
Figure VII.6 TRANSITION OF CIVIC IDENTIFICATION 
BY YEARS IN THE U.S. 
Proud as Korean 
Proud as American 
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N = 202 : for earlier year groups per cents may not make 100, 
because they exclude those who want to remain as alien residents. 
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Among the current respondents, the new civic identity ("being 
proud as American citizens") gradually emerges between 8 and 10 years 
after immigration, coinciding with the optimum adaptation stage of 
Hurh and Kim (op. cit.). After passing through the identification 
crisis (14 years after immigration), the new identity as Americans 
begins to prevail as the old identity declines. Yet they seem to find 
two solutions to the identity dilemma as "Koreans in America" and as 
"Korean-Americans" by 15 years after immigration, a few years earlier 
than Hurh and Kim's suggestion (Table VII.2 and Figure VII.6). 
Table VII.2. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Civic Identification 
(Proud as "Koreans" or "American Citizens") 
Years Americans Koreans 
1 - 5 8.0 % 85.5 % 
6 - 8 25.5 66.6 
9 - 11 31.1 58.7 
12 - 14 51.8 48.2 
15 and over 55.6 44.4 
Total N = 80 N = 143 
2. Transition in Political Issue Preference 
For respondents in the current sample, obviously the turning 
point of political issue preference arrives after 8 to 10 years fol-
lowing immigration (Table VII.3 and Figure VII.7). The proportion of 
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respondents with more interest in Korean politics than in American 
political issues is higher up to 8 years after immigration. Then after 
10 years of immigration the trend reverses; and the proportion of the 
respondents interested in American political issues becomes higher. 
The turning point in political interest coincides with the optimum 
satisfaction stage in Hurh and Kim's model (1978, pp.96-100). 
Table VII.3. Years in the U.S. and Political Issue Preferences 
(% of Respondents with 11Very Much Concern" in Political Issues) 
Korean Issues American Issues 
Years 
1 - 5 52.8 % 27.1 % 
6 - 8 49.0 42.0 
9 - 11 37.8 42.8 
12 - 14 24.9 47.2 
15 and over 33.3 44.4 
Total N 331 325 
When they go through the identification crisis, because they are 
tired of the illusion of Anglo-conformity but are not yet accepted by 
mainstream society, their interest in political issues seems to stum-
ble (although it does not appear clearly in a condensed figure). After 
15 years of immigration, they may remain with marginally accepted feel-
ings, and thus, become less interested in politics whether of America 
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or Korea (Table VII.3). But the current data do not have enough cases 
to make predictions beyond 15 years after immigration. 
Fi ure VII.7 POLITICAL ISSUE PREFERENCE BY YEARS IN THE U.S. 
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3. Transition in Voting 
The first peak in voters' registrations occurs 10 years after 
immigration, during the optimum adaptation stage, in Huhr and Kim's 
model. After that stage, voters' registrations stumble (although it 
does not appear clearly in a condensed figure) but it seems to make 
another upturn after the identification crisis. When they perceive 
status inconsistency and head for the identification crisis stage, 
their interest in American political issues reaches its peak and they 
actively participate in voting, probably in an attempt to overcome 
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perceived institutional barriers. The upward turn of voting rates 
after that critical point (identification crisis) may indicate that 
they are headed toward positive coping behavior instead of passive 
acceptance of marginality, but the current data do not have enough 
cases for a reliable prediction (Table VII.4 and Figure VII.8). We 
cannot be sure about voting trends after 15 years of immigration be-
cause all the available data (including the writer's data) about the 
Korean immigrants are non-random, cross-sectional data. 
If these critical points of issue preference, voters' registra-
tion, and voting did not occur as a result of sampling deficiency, 
then there may be a significant theoretical implication for both adap-
tation and political theories. Although the current data support the 
rejection of a positive linear relationship between the time factor 
and the progress of immigrants' adaptations, the writer feels that 
relationship may not end up in a reverse U-curve either. Hurh and 
Table VII.4. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Voting 
Registered Voter Voted in 
Congressional Local 
Years Election Election 
1 - 5 16.7 % 0 % 0 % 
6 - 9 40.6 26.1 29.5 
10 - 11 69.7 52.3 42.2 
12 - 14 77.4 60.6 41.4 
15 and over 75.0 71.4 28.6 
Valid Cases = 169 (citizens only) 
100 % 
50 
0 
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Figure VII.8 VOTERS REGISTRATION AND VOTING 
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Kim, in their under-going research with Koreans in the Chicago area 
(1986-87), are projecting an alternative upturn in morale around 15 
years concurrently with acceptance of marginality, and creation of a 
new identity by 20 years after immigration. Their alternative model 
seems to hypothesize a lopsided S-curve. 
The current writer found somewhat different indications through 
unplanned encounter~ with Koreans who came to America for their own 
professional advancement but ended up staying longer than 20 years. 
Some have never given up the hope of Geum-Eui-Hwan-Hyang (returning 
home in silk robes) and contributing to the homeland, if political 
stability and opportunities were provided. They may have a dual sense 
of relative deprivation, in reference to American colleagues and in 
reference to their cohorts in the homeland. 
At the same time, there are plenty of Korean senior citizens who 
are content with their lives in the U.S., primarily because of the soc-
ial welfare system. They may be content because they do not have any 
more aspirations in social competition and their prjmary subsistence 
is guaranteed by Uncle Sam rather than by their Hyo-Ja(loyal son) whom 
they use to depend on for their subsistence in the homeland. 
The existence of this relatively aged group does not allow any 
simple prediction about Korean immigrants' adaptation and political 
integration with the time factor. The writer feels that adaptation 
of Koreans in the U.S. might go through a series of cyclical ups and 
downs without full political integration among the first generation 
of Korean immigrants. That prospect for the next generation of Korean 
immigrants is even more uncertain. Further longitudinal studies are 
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needed in order to establish a clearer model of political integration 
of this ilIDiligrant group. 
NOTES 
1. Chong Kim and his colleagues treated data, collected from 
their interviews with 2,276 people in Korea during 1973-1974. 
2. The indication that Koreans in Chicago have reached such a 
position was demonstrated during two-month-long protest activities 
during the Albany Bank incident in the fall of 1985. Mistreatment of 
a Korean customer by an employee of the bank resulted in the arrest 
and forced detention of that Korean male at a mental hospital. Thro-
ugh various organized protest activities, they gained the attention 
of the mainstream media and succeeded in getting written apologies 
from the president of the bank and the Superintendent of the Chicago 
police department. But this "success" was a rather symbolic political 
one. 
3. Hurh and Kim reject the previous adaptation models which 
hypothesize a positive linear relationship between years of residence 
in a new country and satisfactory adaptation (such as by Milton Gordon, 
Assimilation in American Life, 1964). They rather agree with arguments 
that dissatisfaction in immigrants' lives can occur at certain times 
after arrival (A.H. Richmond, Aspects of the Absorption and Adaptation 
of Immigrants, 1974). 
4. The sixth stage in Hurh and Kim's model has been revised by 
the authors for their new research to be completed in 1987. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
A. Summary of the Findings 
The current data support the general postulations in pluralism 
about the positive effect of organizational involvement on political 
competence and the negative relationship between authoritarianism and 
political participatory behavior. 
On Hypothesis 1, liberal authoritarians showed low scores on 
all four political affect items as general postulations. Organiza-
tional participation had an effect on this relationship and increased 
system, civic, and input affect as hypothesized, but lowered output 
affect contradicting the hypothesis. 
Conservative authoritarians showed low system and civic affects 
as generally postulated but showed high input and output affects op-
posing the postulations. In these relationships, organizational in-
volvement increasing civic, input, and output affects as hypothesized 
but lowering system affect. 
On Hypothesis 2, the voting rate was high among all respondents 
with high system, civic, and input affects; but the voting rate could 
not be consistently predicted with output affect. The low or incon-
sistent voting rate associated with high output affect needs further 
investigation. It may have resulted because the high output affect 
group is small in proportion or it may not have been explainable with 
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the current data. 
On Hypothesis 3, authoritarianism itself was not much related 
to preferences for Korean vs. American political issues. Those who 
have high system, civic, input, and output affects are likely to have 
more interest in American political issue than Korean. This is in the 
direction of the hypothesis, although some of the relationship is not 
significant. Also on the liberal/conservative issue dimension, autho-
ritarians tend to express preferences for more basic, need-oriented 
issues than for altruistic ones. Political affects do not have a uni-
form effect in the direction of hypothesis. 
Although some of the relationships were not strong, major find-
ings confirmed the direction of the relationship between authoritari-
anism (either liberal or conservative) and political affect. But it 
was disappointing that the explained variances were too small in the 
test of political affect items. 
One of the writer's goals in this research was to determine a 
causal sequence between organizational involvement and political effi-
cacy. He has been unable to resolve this question with the current 
data, because regression analyses for a path model failed to present 
any significant equation. 
The findings suggest that variables involved in the adaptation 
to the American culture by immigrants have much more influence than do 
individual authoritarianism on their political socialization. Educa-
tional attainment and years of residence in the U.S. are especially 
the most important variables for reaching relative life satisfaction 
in the adopted country and consequently in political socialization. 
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Although the massive immigration of Koreans began only less than 
two decades ago, the current data revealed an indication of changes in 
their political attitudes and behavior. Those who passed the optimum 
adaptation stage began to be more conscious of American politics than 
homeland politics and to participate more actively in voting. 
The current data support a hypothesis by other researchers about 
the relationship between the time factor and adaptation of the Korean 
immigrants. So far the relationship between the time factor and poli-
tical adaptation seems to be curvilinear. However, because the time 
span of the massive immigration experience of this group is so short, 
it may not be safe to make a long-term prediction about its political 
integration. 
If the current data allow any projection as to future trends, it 
can be predicted that the Korean immigrants are highly politicized in 
terms of affective efficacy but this can fluctuate critically depend-
ing on their ability to cope with social barriers associated with 
racism. For this reason, it is desirable to add cognitive and evalu-
ative dimensions of political efficacy to the study of immigrants' 
political assimilation in the U.S. 
Concerning the potential for a stable democracy in their homeland 
(or in other nations which are in similar situations), the role of vol-. 
untary organizations seems also to be encouraging. The writer has tried 
to search out the meaning of the rampantly emerging "voluntary" organi-
zations to the Korean immigrants who were used to much more limited 
experience with voluntaryism in their homeland. Koreans in the U.S. 
are joining with organizations voluntarily (without constraints by any 
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authorities) in search of a sense of belonging and status (linked to 
Garn-Too, a symbolic cap of high office) as argued by the writer 
earlier (1978). Whatever the motive for voluntary associations may 
be, such involvement seems to contribute to political socialization. 
Although the current data suggest that a considerable transition 
of political culture has taken place from the mobilization model of the 
homeland to one of democratic citizenship among the Korean immigrants 
here, there are no available data which might explain how much of such 
a transition has taken place in Korea. This may be a major task for 
future research. 
The current data indicated that very few among the Korean immi-
grants are the ideal-typical allegiant participant, or democratic con-
stituents. Half of the sampled constituents are allegiant subjects 
and more than one-third are alienated subjects. Although the writer 
has no comparable data on such characteristics among their homeland 
contemporaries, he assumes there are no more allegiant participants 
in Korea than in the immigrant community here. 
If this is the case, the realization of a stable democracy seems 
to be still decades away, despite a popular belief that removal of the 
military dictatorship would immediately allow free democracy to bloom. 
Unfortunately, such freedom may not be sufficiently exercised by the 
dominant (in proportion) allegiant subjects nor be properly shielded 
from the liberal-minded alienated subjects. The considerably high 
voting rate will continue regardless of any constitutional revision, 
and rampant protest activities persist irrespective of the policies 
of the government in Korea. Such protest activities may even become 
more rampant with increased freedom as long as there is a big pool 
of liberal, authoritarian, alienated subjects. 
B. Comments on the Method and Data 
There were two types of technical setbacks in this research: 
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(i) with measurement of key variables and (ii) with the sampling. The 
most difficult problem of measurement happened with authoritarianism. 
Reducing the number of authoritarianism items down to six, for the 
sake of brevity, was a risk. And even expanding authoritarianism into 
liberal/conservative dimensions of was rather arbitrary. It may be 
mathematically unsound to rely on such measures, but it seemed worth-
while to attempt to treat the leftist authoritarians as equal partners 
of the conventional rightist authoritarians. 
There may be criticism for treating cognitive traits (openness 
to new ideas and egalitarian values) equally with psychic traits (agg-
ressiveness and submissiveness). But without breaking down the autho-
ritarian items, the writer was unable to find any logical and consis-
tent results in determining relationships between authoritarianism and 
other major variables. The writer feels, as the result of this study, 
that there should definitely be a distinction between authoritarians 
on the left and on the right in future research. It will be desirable, 
to enlist additional questionnaire items to measure these dimensions 
more completely. 
The writer also admits that it is incomplete to measure politi-
cal competence only in terms of affective orientations, leaving out 
the cognitive and evaluative political orientations that the political 
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culture theorists originally introduced. But the writer finds his own 
justification because the Koreans' affective orientations are stronger 
than purely cognitive or evaluative ones. They characterize themselves 
as the nationals of Jung (affection) and Euiree (fraternal piety). 
Even limited knowledge about the affective political efficacy of Kor-
eans (in the U.S.) may shed some light on the possibility of a stable 
democracy in their homeland as well as their political assimilation in 
the U.S. Concern for research economy also made it inevitable to reduce 
the number of factors and variables as much as possible. 
There was also weakness in the randomness of the data. It was 
impossible to estimate sampling error because an accurate number of 
the population has not been attainable other than the one in the 1980 
Census. Fortunately, the demographic characteristics of the current 
sample were found to be very compatible with the 1980 census data. 
Despite these shortcomings, this research makes its own contri-
bution, revealing the unknown political realities and potentials of a 
new immigrant group, although it may be difficult to generalize the 
findings beyond this sample. 
C. Theoretical Implication and Suggestions for Further Research 
1. Support for Pluralism 
The findings reaffirm the general theses of pluralism, i.e., 
that participants in voluntary organizations have higher political 
efficacy and participate more in voting. Organizational involvements 
by the Korean immigrants are almost purely voluntaristic and probably 
more frequent than comparable activities in the homeland. This factor 
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seems to be positively functional for moving a political culture toward 
the democratic citizenship model with the current respondents. 
However, because very few of these immigrants' organizations are 
political organizations oriented to the external community; and because 
the majority of them are oriented toward ethnic concerns, it is not 
clear how much in fact these organizations are contributing positively 
to political acculturation. Especially, the potential role of ethnic 
organizations, in making the choice between creative identity (toward 
Korean-American) or the older regressive identity (toward Koreans in 
America) seems to be dubious at the point of existential dilemma. 
More detailed research is desirable in order to identify what types 
of organizations for this immigrant group are or will be facilitating 
political assimilation vs. ethnic confinement. 
2. Liberal/Conservative Authoritarians 
In addition to the submission/aggression dimension of authori-
tarianism, a liberal/conservative dimension was added in the process 
of analyzing the data. The additional dimension was not considered 
in the original design of the research but was added later for effec-
tiveness of the analysis. The results indicate that liberal authori-
tarians are the major active constituents in Korean politics. Not 
only that, liberal authoritarians have attitudes and behavior (or be-
havior potentials) distinctive from those of conservative authorita-
rians to whom most attention was paid previously. With the growing 
interest in nonconventional political (protest) behavior--not only in 
the U.S. but also in the third world--liberal-authoritarians may be-
come more important targets for future research. 
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3. General Adaptation and Political Assimilation 
The writer found that political acculturation is taking place 
slowly among the Korean inunigrants, and that the critical points in the 
transition coincide with certain stages in an adaptation model by Hurh 
and Kim (1978). This adaptation-stage model for Koreans has been pro-
posed by them as only a hypothetical one and has not been challenged 
or supported by any other party. The interesting coincidence between 
their findings and the writer's provide support for mutual proposi-
tions. Hurh and Kim are testing their hypothetical model a third time 
currently (1987). Their new findings can be tied to further political 
acculturation research. ' 
Clear cut projection can not be made at this point about the ex-
tent of future acculturation and political integration among the Korean 
immigrants because they have been here for only a relatively short time. 
They have already perceived an immutable racial barrier and have begun 
to concede that they will remain unmeltable ethnics. 
At this juncture, their acculturation may progress further and 
also their political integration as Korean-Americans. But if they 
passively accept their social marginality, the first generation immi-
grants may remain as "Koreans in America." 
Under such circumstances, their high organizational activities 
may serve as a functional equivalent to participation in mainstream 
politics or in homeland politics, leaving the potential for further 
political integration undeveloped. As the data suggested, Koreans are 
more protest-prone than the set of five Western nationals (Barnes and 
Kasse, 1979). The alienated Korean immigrants may turn into a highly 
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protest-prone ethnic group with the encouragement of organizational 
involvement. 
However, the prospect for their second generation may be rather 
different, although the majority of the Korean immigrants' children 
who currently arrived at their adulthood are Korean-barns; they are 
labelled as "trans-generation" (T.G.) or "l.S generation." The "1.S 
generation" do not have English language problems (of their parents' 
generation) and are starting their professional careers in the main-
stream occupational strata, after their superb academic achievements. 
They are pressured by their parents to maintain their Korean id-
entity and its cultural values, but they are less sensitive to issues 
of homeland or Korean community. They are not as much active as their 
parents in community organizations and reluctant to express their in-
terest in community leadership. They subscribe more to egalitarian 
values rejecting the authoritarian outlooks of the first generation. 
They show stronger preferences for individualism than collectivism and 
less ethno-centricity. The U.S.-born Korean second generation are 
called "banana generation" because only their skins are yellow (Kore-
anish) but their insides are almost white (American). 
About forty per cent of the Illinois' Korean population was 19 
years old or younger in 1980, according to the 1980 Census (Table IV.2 
in Chapter IV). If this trends hold on, the future Korean immigrant 
community will have lower authoritarianism, higher political efficacy, 
less ethno-centric associations, and less interest in homeland issues, 
when the "trans-" or second generation arrive at their matured leader-
ship. But we cannot predict how active they will be in organizational 
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and political participation. The degree of political assimilation by 
the next generation seems to be much depending on the political achi-
evements and further designs by the first generation. 
4. For Further Research 
Confirming a general postulation of pluralism among the Koreans 
and finding a political acculturation pattern parallel to the curvi-
linear adaptation model are achievements of the current research. The 
writer wishes to see further research in the following fashion and 
magnitude: 
a. Authoritarianism and Political Culture: More elaborated 
measurements are needed for authoritarianism and political efficacy 
(including cognitive and evaluative dimensions). Comparative studies 
(i) between the Koreans in the homeland and in the U.S., and (ii) be-
tween the Koreans and other newly arrived immigrant groups from less 
democratic cultures can be conducted. A nationwide study with a design 
similar to the current one can be conducted in Korea or cross-cultur-
ally. Since protest potential is becoming a more important expression 
of political participation than the electoral process in many of the 
less democratic countries, protest potential deserves major attention 
in such studies. 
b. Acculturation and Political Integration: Continuous longitu-
dinal studies on acculturation, with more refined variables are nec-
essary in order to determine whether new immigrant groups like the 
Koreans are going to be politically integrated or remain alienated. 
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APPENDIX I 
MAJOR VARIABLES AND INDICES 
1. Authoritarianism Index 
In the original F-Scale and the SRC Election studies (1972), the 
respondents were forced to say "Yes" or ''No" to the the questionnaire 
items. In the current study a choice for "undecided" was added in 
order to diffuse the acceptance/rejection response-set problem. The 
"undecided" responses were included later in a "No" category. 
Values assigned for each of the six items: 
"agree"= +1, "disagree"= -1, "undecided"= -1 
a. Addition of 4 items makes Authoritarianism Index. 
item 1 (youth need discipline) 
item 3 (science has limits) 
item 5 (too much equality) 
item 6 (take care of themselves ) 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
The cumulative scores are divide into 2 groupings: 
@ - 4 to 2 •••• nonauthoritarian 
@ 3, 4 •••••• authoritarian 
b. Addition of 2 items make Liberalism Index. 
item 2 (women in politics) 
item 4 (open to new ideas) 
-1 
-1 
The total scores are divide into 2 groupings: 
@ -2 •••••••• liberal 
@ -1 to 2 •••• conservative 
2. Organization Indices 
0 
0 
1 
1 
The responses to each organization are coded with different values 
as assigned in the following manner; 
membership; nonmember = 0, member only= 1, officer = 2, 
participation; rarely = 0 , sometimes = 1, often = 2 
a. Organization Membership Index: 
The cumulative scores of the membership items are divided 
into 3 groupings. 
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@ 0 •••••• nonmember 
@ 1,2 •••• menial member 
@ 3 and over ••• active member 
b. Organizational participation Index: 
The cumulative scores of the participation items are divide 
into 3 groupings. 
@ 0 ••••• nonparticipant 
@ 1 to 3 ••• moderate participant 
@ 4 and over ••• active participant 
c. Composite Organization Index: 
The degree of membership, officership, and participation are 
combined into following 5 rank index. 
Composite membership participation officer 
Org. Index 1 none none none 
2 yes none none 
3 one yes none 
4 two or more yes none 
5 yes yes yes 
3. Political Affect Indices 
a. System Affect Index: 
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To determine the positive, negative or lack of feelings of the 
respondents toward the general political system, the current research 
drew four politically relevant items from the 10-items asked in the ICPR 
questionnaire. Those are the affects toward full democratic system, 
social welfare system, economic system, and advanced technology 
and national strengths (Question II.15). The responses to the four 
system affect items were coded as follows: 
i) Degree of pride and respect for the country 
very much = 3 somewhat = 2 not at all = 1 
ii) The cumulative scores were divided into 3 groupings 
@ 0 to 6 = low system affect 
@ 7 to 10 = moderate system affect 
@ 11, 12 =high system affect 
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b. Civic Affect Index: 
The ICPR(Almond and Verba) questionnaire measured the respondents' 
feeling of obligation to country allowing multiple responses toward 
10 items of civic duty. In the current study (Question II.13), the 
respondents' feelings about four key civic duties (voting, paying taxes, 
serving on a jury, and defending the country) were asked and coded as 
follows: 
i) Scores assigned 
@ satisfied with civic duties = 3 
@ do it only because it is duty = 2 
@ feel somewhat annoyed = 1 
Because there are so many missing case on jury and defense 
items, one-third of the total sample should be excluded without an 
adjustemnt. A mean value (1.5) of the four ranks of the qestionnaire 
items (O + 1 + 2 + 3 = 6: 6/4 = 1.5) was assigned in the place of 
missing values on jury and defense items. 
ii) The cumulative scores of the four items are divide into 
3 groupings. 
@ 0 to 5 = low civic affect 
@ 6 to 9 = moderate civic affect 
@ 10 to 12 = high civic affect 
c. Input Affect Index: 
E.N. Muller (1979) rearranged the 6 items of the !CPR question-
naire (Variables 39 through 45) to form a scale to measure the ability 
to influence government. These items ask the respondents what they 
would and can do to change regulations which they consider unjust or 
harmful (both at local and national levels). In the current study those 
items were reduced to three items asking what they would do, how suc-
cessful they think they would be, and if they ever tried to exercise 
these input attempts. Two input-efficacy items (Question II.14.a & b) 
were treated as follows: 
i) Values assigned 
••• "how much successful in input attempts?" 
@ very likely = 4 
@ somewhat unlikely = 2 
@ moderately likely = 3 
@ not at all likely = 1 
••• "what do you think you could do?" 
@ protest activities= 1 @ do nothing= 2 @write, organized 
activities, vote =3 @ checking more than two items = 4 
ii) Scores of the two items multiplied and sorted into 
Input 
Attempt 
3 groups. 
@ 0 to 4 = low input affect 
@ 6,8,9 = moderate input affect 
@ 12,16 = high input affect 
Feeling of Success 
1 2 3 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 4 6 
3 3 6 9 
4 4 8 12 
d. Output Affect Index: 
4 
4 
8 
12 
16 
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The !CPR questionnaire has four items on output affect, asking 
the respondents if they thought they would get serious attention and 
equal treatment like everyone else when they presented their questions 
or point of view to the government officials or police. In the current 
study, two output efficacy items were used without distinction between 
local and federal authorities, and made into a scale as follows: 
i) Values assigned • 
••• equal treatment by the authorities 
@ surely equal treatment = 5/ @ may get equal treatment = 4 
@ it depends = 3/ @ may not get equal treatment = 2 
@ will ignore my question = 1 
••• attention to your point of view 
@ seriously consider = 5/ @ pay some attention = 4 
@ it depends = 3/ @ would not say anything = 3 
@ will ignore my point of view = 1 
ii) Scores of the two items were multiplied and sorted into two 
groups 
@ 1 - 6 = low output affect 
@ 8 - 15 = moderate output affect 
@ 16 - 25 = high output affect 
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Attention to Your Point of View 
1 2 3 4 5 
Equal 
Treatment 1 1 2 3 4 5 
by 2 2 4 6 8 10 
Authorities 3 3 6 9 12 15 
4 4 8 12 16 20 
5 5 10 15 20 25 
4. The Political Participation Indices 
a. Participation in Electoral Process 
The respondents' actual participation in the political processes 
were originally measured with the following six items. The sum of the 
scores on these six items were divided into six and the numbers below 
decimal points were rounded to make up the Participation Index. How-
ever, because there were too many "did not" responses, 87.8 per 
cent 
of the valid responses fell into a moderate participant category, thus 
limiting the utility of the index. 
Six Items of Political Participation (in Per Cent) 
Did Did Not Will Do Missing 
Discussion with Politicians 7.3 71.4 17.5 3.8 
Rallies 5.0 78.7 12.2 4.1 
Donation 9.6 73.2 13.1 4.1 
Vote in 82 Natl' Election 25.9 64.1 5.0 5.0 
Vote in 83 Local Election 20.1 64.7 9.9 5.2 
Writing to Media 2.3 73.5 20.1 4.1 
b. The Protest Index 
The Protest Index was made up of the responses to the four 
items, which asked if they approved of the major protest activities. 
The cumulative scores on the four items were divided into four and the 
numbers below decimal points were rounded: 
Frequncies on Protest Index 
Protest Index 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
Four Protest Items 
N 
47 
162 
81 
Per Cent 
13.7 % 
55.9 % 
27.9 % 
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i) Protest Letter to the Politicians: About half of the res-
pondents approved of writing protest letters to politicians but there 
was no difference between nonauthoritarians and authoritarians. 
Approval of protest lettesr has a significant positive relation-
ship with educational attainment (Gamma=.23), and also positive rela-
tionship with the length of residence in the U.S. (Gamma=.24) and with 
citizenship. White-collar workers are slightly more likely to approve 
of writing protest letters than blue-collar workers (Gamma= -.11) 
and women are significantly less in favor of protest letters than 
men (Gamma= -.29). 
ii) Demonstration and Marching: It is interesting to see that 
only 28.8 % of the Korean respondents approved of political demonstra-
tions and marches despite the common notion that the students' demons-
trations have been the most effective means of expressing dissent to 
the government in Korea. Student demonstrations actually overthrew 
the regime of President Syng Man Rhee in 1961 and have been feared most 
by the military successors in Korea. 
Authoritarians in general are less in favor of demonstrations 
than nonauthoritarians. About a quarter (24.4 %) of authoritarians 
approved and 17.1 % disapproved. About one-third (31.2 %) of the non-
authoritarians approved demonstrating and 11.3 % disapproved. 
As expected, females are less likely to approve demonstrations 
than males (21.5 % vs. 32.1 %; Gamma= -.18). College educated res-
pondents are more likely to approve of demonstrations than the high 
school graduates (Gamma=.12). Blue-collar workers are more likely to 
approve demonstrations than white-collar workers(Gamma= -.11), pre-
sumably because of work-site experiences of strikes or more frustration 
in human relations at work. Although there are some income groupings 
which approves of demonstrations more than others, there is no linear 
relationship between income and approval of demonstration. 
The naturalized U.S. citizens tend to approve of demonstrations 
153 
more than do the resident aliens (Gamma=.14). Those who have lived 
longer than 5 years in the U.S. are more likely to approve than those 
who lived less than five years in the U.S. (Gamma= .11). 
iii) Disobeying Unjust Government Actions: Disobeying an un-
just law or action by government authorities is approved of by 39.5 % 
of the respondents. There is a significant positive relationship be-
tween authoritarianism and disobedience (Gamma=.20). More authoritari-
ans (44.7 %) approve of this type of protest than do nonauthoritarians 
(36.7 %). 
Females are less likely to approve of disobedience than do males 
(32.7 % vs. 42.6 %, Gamma=-.17). College-educated respondents are more 
likely to approve disobedience than the high school educated (Gamma 
=.11). While the approval of disobeying is low among the clericals 
(16.7 %), service workers (20.0 %), and small-business operators (28.6 
%). More than 40 % of the professionals and factory workers approve 
this type of protest. 
Although those in the upper income brackets are less likely to 
approve of disobedience, income has not a linear relationship with such 
approval of disobedience. Neither years of residence in this country 
nor legal status of citizenship/resident alien makes a difference on 
the matter of disobeying governmental actions. 
iv) Stopping Government: Less than one-fourth (24.1 %) approve 
of violent actions that may stop the normal functions of the government. 
Authoritarians are less likely to approve (20.1 %) than the nonauthori-
tarians (26.2 %). 
Females are less likely to approve of violent protests than males 
(Gamma= -.20). Only 16.0 % of females approve violent protests vs. 
27.4 % for males. Educational attainment, occupational status, and 
income have no significant relationship with approval of violent protest 
nor do the years of residence in this country. However, the naturalized 
U.S. citizens are more likely to approve of such protests (28.3%) than 
the alien residents (19.3 %). 
5. The Political Issue Index 
a. Homeland vs. American Political Issue Index 
Two sets of questions concerning issue preferences were asked 
of the respondents. Qestion No.II.7 asked about the degree of interest 
in Korean vs. American politics, and if they were involved in political 
discussions as shown in Table VI.8. The sum of the three of the six 
items which concern Korean politics and politicians were divided into 
three categories and make up the Korean Political Issue Index, while 
the other three items make up the American Politics Issue Index in 
the same manner. 
Korean vs. American Political Issue Index 
American Issue Index 
Korean Issues Index 
Low 
7.1 
9.0 
Moderate High 
55.8 
48.8 
37.1 
42.2 
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Row Total 
100.0 (N = 326) 
100.0 (N = 332) 
b. The Liberal-Conservative Political Issues Index 
Question No.II.8 aksed for the traditional liberal vs. conser-
vative responses to the three-pair items (Table VI.10). It was not 
reasonably possible to obtain clear-cut liberal vs. conservativethe 
responses from the data. If they were coded into dichotomous indices 
they would not be clearly correlated with liberal-conservative traits 
of authoritarianism. The responses rather seem to reflect altruistic 
(for the liberals) and self-preservative (for the conservatives) atti-
tudes. At any rate they were given the status of liberal vs. conser-
vative issue preferences. And the Liberal-Conservative Issue Index 
was made up so that on a continuum the lower values represent liberal-
ism and the higher values represent conservatism, in the following 
manner: 
Liberal/Conservative Issue Preference 
Liberal 
three 
two 
one 
none 
vs. Conservative Choices 
none 
one 
two 
three 
Missing cases=54 
Issue Index 
1. Low (liberal) 
2. 
3. 
4. High(Conservative) 
% 
16.9 
41.0 
33.8 
8.3 
APPENDIX II 
CENSUS DATA AND CURRENT SAMPLE 
1. Sampling Strategy and Schedule 
Out of the 7,500 subscribers of the Korea Times, three typical 
characteristic clusters related to the history of Korean's mobility 
were initially selected as follows: 
a. The inner city samples were selected from the neighborhoods 
where relatively newer Korean immigrants are living. These areas are 
Lakeview (zip codes 60613,60657), Uptown (zip code 60640), Rogers Park 
(zip codes 60645,60659), and Albany Park (zip codes 60618,60625,60630). 
b. The suburban samples were selected from (a) the near north 
suburban towns such as Skokie, Morton Grove, Des Plaines, Glenview 
(the first three digits of zip code is 600), (b) northwest suburbs 
such as Elk Grove Village, Schaumburg area, Elmhurst (the first three 
digits of zip code are 600 or 601), and (c) southern suburbs such as 
Sampling Schedule 
Areas 1st Wave/Returns 2nd Wave 3rd Wave Total Returns (%) 
Chicago City 
Lakeview 114 I 15 74 
Rogers Park 87 I 14 51 
Albany Park 216 I 45 120 
Sub Total 417 
Suburbs 
Near North 103 I 11 87 
North West n I 16 42 
Southern 34 22 
Sub Total 208 
Other than Cook county suburbs 
Chicago Area Total 625 : 
28 
31 
51 
174 (41.7%) 
0 35 (34.0%) 
0 31 (43.7%) 
0 11 (32.3%) 
77 (37.7%) 
16 
268 (42.9%) 
Analyzable cases 242(38.8%) 
Neighboring States(one batch/returns) 
Ind. 81 I 23; Ga. 54 I 17; 
Minn. 58 I 15; Mo. 73 I 18; 
Sub Total 452 I 128: 
Total Return 
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Mich. 104 I 31; 
Wis. 82 I 24. 
128 (28.3%) 
Analyzable cases 102(22.6%) 
396 out of 1,077 (36.8%) 
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Hindsdale, Downers Grove, Palos Heights, and Lombard (the first three 
digits of zip code are 604 or 605). 
c. Four neighboring states and Georgia were included in the 
survey because the Koreans in these states share the sense of com-
munity with Chicago's Koreans by subscribing for the same newspaper 
and share similar social characteristics. 
2. Census Data and Current Sample 
According to the 1980 census, the median age of the Korean-
American population in the country (total 354,593) is 26.1 years and 
26.9 years in Illinois (total 24,351). The median age of current 
sample is 40.0 years because the sample was drawn from adult popula-
tion (over 20 years old) while the census includes persons under 19 
years old. But when only the persons over age 20 considered, the T-
Test shows that the mean age of the Koreans in census is not signifi-
cantly different from that of the current sample (F=6.99; with d.f. 1 
and 10; 0.05 < p < 0.01). 
The educational achievement status is a little difficult to 
compare because the junior and senior high school systems are not 
identical between the two countries and the measurements are organi-
zed differently in the census and current survey. The T-Test after 
adjusting the measurement of the current survey into four categories, 
compatible with the census measurement (Table II. 2) shows that the 
mean education scores of the two groups are different (F=18.84: with 
d.f. 1 and 6; p < 0.01). The frequency distributions indicate that 
under-educated people are counted more in the census than in most of 
Korean community surveys, which usually show that two-thirds of the 
Korean immigrants are college graduates. 
However, when the educational achievement categories are col-
lapsed into two (high school graduates or under vs. college educated) 
the there remains no difference between the census population and 
the current sample (F=16.68; with d.f. 2 and 1; 0.05 < p < 0.01 ). 
It may be said that Korean community surveys draw more responses from 
highly educated people, however, the basic constituency is not signi-
ficantly different in terms of educational achievement. 
The comparison of occupational status does not show that the 
current sample represent the census population with statistical 
significance (see Tables II.5 & II.6). The census has more represen-
tation from factory workers than the current sample (skilled and non-
skilled workers 22.7 % vs. 6.1 %), while the ratio of self-employed 
proprietors is reversed (6.2 % vs. 17.4 %). Also the proportion of 
white collar job holders decreases from 1980 Census (33.5 %) to cur-
rent sample (29.7 %). However, if the occupational categories are 
collapsed into three (white-collars vs. others, and unemployed) the 
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group difference disappears (F=0.57; with d.f. 1 and 4: p < 0.01). 
The income status needs no comparison because the average income (com-
bined gross annual household income) of the current sample far exceeds 
that of the Koreans in the census ($35,788 vs. $22,833). 
To sum up, the current sample shares identical characteristics 
in age and educational achievements with the Illinois' Koreans. And 
the proportion of white-collar workers and unemployed are very close. 
Considering the three-and-half years time gap between the two sets of 
data, there is no significant difference between the two groups even 
though there is a considerable income gap between the two data. 
3. Variance Between the Sampling Blocks 
The crosstabulation of age distribution among the three clusters 
indicates that the Chicago city sample has slightly more (about a dozen 
more) elderly respondents than the suburban and out-of-state clusters 
but Chi-square is not significant. And the T-test proves that there is 
no difference in variance from the mean age between Chicago area (inc-
luding suburbs) and the out-of-state samples (F=l.83 with d.f. 1 and 
11; p < 0.01). 
The crosstabulation of educational distribution shows that Chi-
cago city sample has more college-educated people than the suburban 
and out-of-state samples (Chi-square: significant at 0.002 level with 
d.f. 14). But the T-test shows that there is no difference in variance 
from the mean between Chicago area and out-of-state samples (F=l.07 
with d.f. 1 and 14; p < 0.01). 
The occupational characteristics are not significantly different 
among the three cluster samples although the suburban sample has a 
slightly higher proportion of technical level professionals and small 
Table.A.II.I. Age ComQarison by SamQling Blocks 
( in per cent ) 
Age 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-over Total 
Block! 11.2 38.3 34.6 11.2 3.7 0.9 107 
Block2 6.0 35.8 46.3 10.4 1.5 0.0 67 
Block3 12.3 37.0 32.1 9.3 6.8 2.5 162 
Sampling Blocks 1: Out of State 2: Chicago Suburbs 3: thicago. 
Missing Cases=8 
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of proprietors. 1he T-test also shows that Chicago area sample and the 
out-of-state sample are not different in their variances from the 
mean (F=3.42; with d.f. 1 and 18; p < 0.01). 
Income distribution of the three clusters are slightly different 
because Chicago city sample has more people with incomes under $ 20,000 
and fewer people in the above $50,000 level (however, the Chi-square 
value is not significant although Gamma is -.12). Also the T-test 
tells that Chicago area and out-of-state samples have different vari-
ance from the mean (F=13.64; with d.f .1 and 18; 0.05 < p ). 
Table.A.II.2. Educational Attainment: Comparison by Sampling Blocks 
( in per cent ) 
Blockl Block2 Block3 Total 
High School Graduates 
or under 34.7 32.3 16.8 82 
College Educated 56.4 52.3 76.7 210 
Graduate Studies 8.9 15.4 6.5 29 
Column Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 321 
Missing Cases=23 
Table.A.II.3. Occupational Comparison 
( in per cent ) 
bx Sampling Blocks 
Blockl Block2 Block3 Total 
Professional 16.0 9.4 6.8 25 
Technical 16.0 35.8 21.2 56 
Managerial 24.0 15.1 27.1 58 
Clerical 1.3 3.8 7.6 12 
Skilled Worker 5.3 1.9 3.4 9 
Non-skilled Worker 6.7 3.8 4.2 12 
Proprietor 5.3 3.8 6.8 14 
Service Worker 2.7 o.o 2.5 5 
Others(Employed) 22.7 26.4 20.3 55 
Column Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 246 
Missing Cases=98 
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The years of sojourn in this country is significantly shorter 
among the Chicago city sample than the suburban and out-of-state 
samples (Chi-square is significant at 0.02 level with d.f. 16 and 
Gamma= -.16). Also the T-test shows that Chicago area and out-of-
state samples are different in their variances from the mean (F=6.57; 
with d.f. 1 and 16; 0.05 < p < 0.01). 
Table.A.II.4 Income Com2arison by Sam2ling Blocks 
( in per cent ) 
Block! Block2 Block3 Total 
Under $ 10,000 6.5 1.5 4.2 15 
$ 10,000 - $ 19,999 16.7 7.5 21.8 59 
$ 20,000 - $ 29,999 24.0 19.4 26.0 82 
$ 30,000 - $ 39,999 13.9 20.9 17.6 58 
$ 40,000 - $ 49,999 8.4 15.0 8.5 33 
$ 50,000 and over 30.6 35.8 21.8 93 
Column Total 100.1 100.1 99.9 340 
Missing Cases=4 
APPENDIX III 
The ~estionnaire 
Please fill in following information about yourself (Fill in or 
circle appropriate category). 
SECTION I. 
1 • Age: ____ years old. 
2. Gender: Male ( ), Female ( ). 
3. Marital status: Married ( ), single ( ), divorced ( ), other ( ) 
4. Legal status in ~he U.S. 
a. American citizen ( ), b. permanent resident ( ), 
c.others (state ) 
if you are a citizen have you registered for voting? Yes ( ), No( ) 
5. Please check your highest school grade/degree completed. 
in Korea in the U.S. 
a. less than high school ( ) ( ) 
b. some high school ( ) ( ) 
c. high school graduated ( ) ( ) 
d. some college attended ( ) ( ) 
e. college graduated ( ) ( ) 
f. some post-college works ( ) ( ) 
g. master's degree ( ) ( ) 
h. doctoral degree ( ) ( ) 
i. other(state ) 
6. Are you currently employed? 
( ) yes(specify your job title ) 
( ) employed before but,laid off 
( ) looking for work 
( ) retired 
( ) home maker 
( ) student 
( ) never worked 
7. What was your family's approximate gross annual income (in 1982)? 
·$ ______ _ 
8. How long have you been in the States? ( ) years ( ) months. 
9. What is your religious affiliation? 
Protestant ( ) Buddhist ( ) Catholic ( ) other (specify 
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10. What is the major news medium that you rely on to find out how the 
world is going around(rank the following types in order of great-
est importance. Mark 1 for most important, 2 to for next, upto 5. 
a. American TV ( ) 
b. American papers ( ) 
c. Korean language newspapers ( ) 
d. American radios ( ) 
e. Korean language TV or radios ( ) 
11. Do you regularly read English newspapers? Check one. 
Of ten Sometimes Rarely Never 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
12. How of ten do you listen to the radio for 
news? Check one. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
13. How of ten do you watch TV for news broadcasts? 
Check one after each. 
a. national news in the early morning. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
b. national early evening news. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
c. local early evening news. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
d. local late night news. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
e. political news specials. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
* There were 14 additional questions concerning newspaper readership 
asked to the respondents in the first wave mailing but deleted in 
later questionnnaires. 
SECTION II. 
1. Between Korean and English, which language do you use more frequ-
ently at home? Check one. 
a. always Korean only ( ) 
b. mostly Korean with some English ( ) 
c. about half Korean and half English ( ) 
d. mostly English with some Korean ( ) 
e. always English only ( ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
2. How well do you read, speak, and write in English? Check one after 
each type. 
fluent (1) 
a. reading 
b. speaking 
c. writing 
good (2) fair (3) 
( ) ( 
( ) ( 
( ) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
poor (4) 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) 
) 
) 
( 
( 
( 
) 
) 
) 
not at all (5) 
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3. Are you a member of the following organizations? And have you held 
any officership in the organizations? And how often do you attend 
those organizational meetings? 
(Check all that apply) 
member officer 
(Check one) 
attendance 
sometimes rarely 
a. provincial(homeland) organization ( 
b. high school alumni ( 
c. college or university alumni ( 
d. church related organization ( 
e. service function organization ( 
f. professional organization ( 
g. the Korean Association of Chicago ( 
h. other,specify ( 
________ ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
) ( 
of ten ) I ( ) I ( ) I ( ) I ( ) I ( ) I ( ) I ( ) I ( ) I ( 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
) ( ) ( ) 
4. How many times during the past 12 months have exchanged social 
visits with American friends (e.g.invite to your home or get in-
vited to their homes)? 
a. once ( ) 
b. 2 to 5 times ( ) 
c. 5 to 9 times ( ) 
d. ten times or more ( ) 
e. never ( ) 
5. Please, mark each of the following items showing how much you agree 
or disagree with the following statements. Check one under each. 
disagree (1) undecided (2) agree (3) 
a. What young people most need 
is strict parental discipline. ( 1 2 3 ) 
b. Women should stay out of politics.( 1 2 3 ) 
c. Science has its place, but there are 
many important things that can 
never possibly be understood. ( 1 2 3 ) 
d. People should pay attention to 
new ideas even if they seem against 
to what people generally think. ( 1 2 3 ) 
e. In many respects equality has 
gone too far in this conutry. ( 1 2 3 ) 
f. All but the handicapped and old 
should take care of themselves. ( 1 2 3 ) 
6. When you gather for organizational meetings, how often do you have 
occasion to talk about politics. Check one. 
a. on almost all the occasions I attend ( ) 
b. on about half of the occasions I attend ( ) 
c. sometimes but not of ten ( ) 
d. scarcely ( ) 
e. never ( ) 
165 
7. If you talk about politics at such meetings, what would you be 
mostly concerned about? Check one after each. Mark one. 
would be concerned very much (1)/ not much (2)/ almost not (3) 
a. current issues in American politics. ( 1 2 3 ) 
b. organizing Koreans to consolidate their powers in ( 1 2 3 ) 
America. 
c. American politicians at local and national levels. ( 1 2 3 ) 
d. current issues in Korean politics. ( 1 2 3 ) 
e. who's who in the Korean politics. ( 1 2 3 ) 
f. efforts to help or influence homeland politics. ( 1 2 3 ) 
g. other ( list ) ( 1 2 3 ) 
8. Of the following pairs of political issue statements, which one do 
you feel easier to support? Check either (a) or (b) under each. 
9. 
*In the Korean affairs the U.S.government should put emphasis on ••• 
a. maintaining the national security and 
any other needs. ( ) 
b. influencing the Korean government for 
rights and democratic development. ( 
political status than 
the improvement of human 
) 
*In domestic policy, the U.S. government should spend more ••• 
a. on its aid to education and social welfare programs ( ) 
b. on national defence and foreing military assistance ( ) 
* In the area of minority political participation, the Korean com-
munity should aim ••• 
a. to place Koreans in the public offices as much as possible ( ) 
b. support American politicians and obtain maximum access to policy 
making through them ( ) 
During the past one year have you participated any of the following 
activities. Mark appropriate number. 
yes (1)/ no (2)/ intend to (3) 
a. attend political meetings where they have 
political discussions or have politician(s) 
invited. (1 2 3) 
b. attend political rallies for a candidate or 
a political party. (1 2 3) 
c. donate money to a candidate or party. (1 2 3) 
d. vote in the last November election. (1 2 3) 
e. vote in the April local election. (1 2 3) 
g. write an opinion letter to Korean newspaper (1 2 3) 
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10. 'nlere are many ways for people to show their disapproval or dis-
agreement with government's policies and actions. Would you show 
which one from below you approve/disapprove as the means for show-
ing dissatisfaction with the U.S.government? 
Mark appropriate numbers: 
approve (1)/ disapprove (2)/ depends on circumstance (3) 
a. writing letters of protest to politicians. ( 1 2 3 ) 
b. protest meetings and marches permitted 
by local authorities(such as the protest 
against education budget cuts). ( 1 2 3 ) 
c. refusing to obey a law which one thinks 
unjust, and risking to go to jail(e.g. 
police brutality). ( 1 2 3 ) 
d. attempting to stop the government from its 
usual activities(e.g.sit-ins, mass rallies) 
after failing in other means of protest. ( 1 2 3 ) 
11. If you have any preference for American political parties what 
label would you identify with? Check one. 
Democrats/ Republicans/ Independents/ others (state 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
) 
12. a. Suppose there were some questions that you had to take to the 
"authorities"-- for example, a tax assessment, immigration 
status, or a traffic ticket by the police--, do you think you 
would be given equal treatment, as well as anyone else? 
( ) They surely will give me equal treatment. 
( ) I may get equal treatment. 
( ) They will ignore my questions • 
( ) It depends. 
( ) I may not get equal treatment. 
b. If You explained your point of view to the officials what effect 
do you think it would have? 
( ) they will seriously consider 
( ) they will pay some attention 
( ) they will ignore my point of view 
( ) it depends 
( ) they would not say anything 
13. How close are these statements to describe your feelings about 
performing following citizens' duties? 
feel worthwile (1)/ do it only because it is duty (2)/ 
feel somewhat annoyed (3) 
a. when you pay taxes. ( 1 2 3 ) 
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b. when you have to go to vote. ( 1 2 3 ) 
c. if you were asked by a court to serve 
on a jury. ( 1 2 3 ) 
d. if you(or your son) are asked to register 
for draft. ( 1 2 3 ) 
14. Suppose a regulation is being considered by the city council or 
the legislatures of the state or congress, and that you considered 
it very unjust or harmful(e.g. mandating every household to own a 
handgun), what do you think you could do? 
a. Check all that you may do. 
) probably do nothing. ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
) write or talk to politicians(alderman or congressman etc.) 
) work through organized groups 
) express opinion by voting. 
) take some protest activities, such as sit-ins, march, or 
some violent actions if necessary. 
( ) simply disobey 
b. If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely 
is it that you would succeed. Check one. 
( ) very likely 
( ) moderately likely 
( ) somewhat unlikely 
( ) not at all likely 
c. Have you ever done anything to try to influence a political 
(local, state, and federal) decision? Check one. 
( ) of ten 
( ) once or twice, a few times 
( ) never 
15. Speaking about America, the new country you are living in, what 
aspects gives you the most pride and respect for the country? 
Mark the degree of pride you feel with apropriate numbers. 
Very much (1)/ somewhat (2)/ not at all (3) 
a. democratic system which guarantees 
equality and justice for all ( 1 2 3 ) 
b. social legislation which provides 
basic welfare for all ( 1 2 3 ) 
c. economic system which provides chance 
for everyone to make living ( 1 2 3 ) 
d. its industrial, technological, and 
military strength ( 1 2 3 ) 
16. Are you proud of yourself for becoming an American citizen or 
a permanent resident? Check one. 
( ) I'm proud of becoming a citizen 
( ) I'm proud of becoming a permanent resident 
( ) I'd rather be proud of being a Korean 
( ) I am not sure about which identity I should proud of 
( ) don't know 
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* Three more items were asked for suggestions to the Korea Times and 
1. If you have any suggestions to the Korea Times, please, fill in the 
following space. 
2. Is your newpaper delivered on time? 
( ) yes 
( ) it misses times a week 
---
3. Your postal zip code 
-------
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